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PRIVACY AS PRETEXT
Susan Hazeldean t
The terms of the debate over LGBT rights have shifted in
recent years, particularly since the Supreme Court made mar-
riage equality the law of the land in ObergefeU v. Hodges.
Today, people against LGBT equality argue that curtailing
LGBT rights is necessary to protect the rights of others. One
potent rhetorical weapon used to oppose LGBT rights is the
claim that antidiscrimination protections for LGBT people un-
dermine privacy because they permit transgender people to
use facilities that accord with their gender identity. This Arti-
cle uses legal privacy theory to show that allowing trans-
gender people into gendered facilities does not undermine
privacy in any legally cognizable sense. In making this argu-
ment, I engage with the work of scholars who have developed
various philosophical understandings of privacy thought to
justify a legal right to its protection. Privacy has been concep-
tualized as: a "right to be let alone"; a means to limit access to
the self; a safeguard of intimacy; a right to control information;
a defense for personhood; and protection for social networks.
But none of these conceptions of privacy support a right for
cisgender' objectors to exclude transgender people from facili-
ties that accord with their gender identity. Indeed, examining
the issue through these privacy theories shows that excluded
transgender people are the ones whose privacy is violated.
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Heidi Gilchrist, Cynthia Godsoe, Minna Kotkin, Solangel Maldonado, Kate
Mogulescu, Jason Parkin, Elizabeth Schneider, Jocelyn Simonson, and Ed Stein
for helpful comments and conversations. I am grateful to participants in the Law
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1 Throughout this Article, I use the term "cisgender" to describe people who
are not transgender; a cisgender woman is one who was assigned female at birth,
while a cisgender man is one assigned male at birth.
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Opponents' privacy claims are just a pretext to justify rolling
back antidiscrimination protections for LGBT people.
I also show that accepting a privacy right to exclude trans-
gender people from gendered facilities would harm all women
and girls. The privacy arguments being made to oppose LGBT
rights echo a troubling history of using privacy concerns to
justify unequal treatment of women. They also reify negative
stereotypes about men and women, undermining sex equality
and making all people more vulnerable to discrimination, mis-
treatment, and assault.
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INTRODUCTION
The terms of the debate over LGBT rights have shifted in
recent years, particularly since the Supreme Court made mar-
riage equality the law of the land in Obergefell v. Hodges.
2
Formerly, those opposed to LGBT rights made broad claims
that homosexuality and gender variance were morally wrong
and argued that states should limit LGBT people's rights in
order to uphold traditional values.3 Post-Obergefel, tradition-
alists know that such arguments are unlikely to succeed in
courts or even in political campaigns. But opposition to LGBT
rights has not gone away; instead, opponents simply frame
their clams differently.4 Today, those opposed to LGBT equal-
2 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
3 See Shannon Price Minter, "Dj4 Vu All Over Again": The Recourse to Biol-
ogy by Opponents of Transgender Equality, 95 N.C. L. REv. 1161, 1175 (2017).
4 Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based
Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2553 (2015) (not-
[Vol. 104:17191720
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ity argue that curtailing LGBT rights is necessary to protect the
freedom and dignity of others. Traditionalists claim that anti-
discrimination protection for LGBT people invades the privacy
of women and girls by permitting men to enter women's bath-
rooms. An asserted need to safeguard women's privacy has
become a rallying cry for the opponents of laws forbidding dis-
crimination based on gender identity or sexual orientation.
But the privacy concerns asserted in opposition to anti-
discrimination protections for LGBT people are nothing more
than a pretext to justify continued discrimination.5 This Article
uses legal privacy theory to demonstrate that there is no genu-
ine privacy interest in excluding transgender people from facili-
ties that accord with their gender identity. In making this
argument, I engage with the work of scholars who have identi-
fied philosophical conceptions of privacy that justify a legal
right to its protection. Privacy has been described variously as:
a "right to be let alone";6 a means to limit access to the self;7 a
safeguard of intimacy;8 a right to control information;9 a de-
fense for personhood; 10 and protection for social networks. 11 A
ing that "[wihen defenders of traditional marriage can no longer persuade by
appeal to shared beliefs about the wrongs of same-sex relationships, they may
instead appeal to beliefs about the Importance of protecting religious pluralism,
revising the secular rationale for the claim in a way that gives more direct and
uninhibited expression to its religious logic. Accommodating complicity-based
conscience claims in these circumstances may function to enable 'preservation
through transformation': when an existing legal regime is successfully challenged
so that its rules and reasons no longer seem persuasive or legitimate, defenders
may adopt new rules and reasons that preserve elements of the challenged
regime.")
5 I do not dispute that some who seek to exclude transgender people from
gendered facilities are sincerely anxious about their presence. But even when a
cisgender objector genuinely feels threatened by a transgender woman using the
women's bathroom, for example, the underlying motive for that unease is discrim-
inatory: the person objecting believes the transgender woman is not a "real"
woman or views her as disordered or dangerous because of her gender identity.
Viewing a person in that light simply because she is transgender is discrimination
based on sex, gender, and gender identity. So, while the objector purports to be
concerned about privacy, the actual underlying motivation is anti-transgender
discrimination, and privacy is therefore a pretext.
6 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REv. 193, 195 (1890).
7 Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of the Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423
(1980).
8 Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HAPV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 280
(1977).
9 ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).
10 J. Braxton Craven, Jr., Personhood: The Right to Be Let Alone, 1976 DUKE
L.J. 699, 702.
11 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L.
REv. 919, 970 (2005).
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careful examination demonstrates that none of these varied
conceptions of privacy support a right for cisgender objectors to
exclude transgender people from facilities that accord with
their gender identity.
My legal privacy theory analysis also shows that it is trans-
gender people excluded from facilities matching their gender
identity who truly face grave privacy violations. Exclusionary
policies forcing transgender people to use sex-segregated facili-
ties according to their assigned sex at birth cause significant
privacy problems, including outing transgender people, under-
mining their ability to live according to their true gender iden-
tity, and encouraging anti-transgender bullying and
harassment. A desire for privacy in the bathroom is legitimate,
but policies that allow transgender people to use bathrooms
that accord with their gender identity do not undermine
privacy.
This analysis is urgent because in state legislatures across
the country, 12 lawmakers are considering bills with the stated
purpose of safeguarding women's and children's privacy13 by
forbidding people from using a bathroom that does not accord
with their "biological sex."14 These measures have names like
12 S.B. 206, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2017). Other proposed bills
include the Arkansas Physical Privacy and Safety Act, S.B. 774, 91st Gen. As-
semb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017); Child Privacy Act, H.B. 664, 100th Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2017); Kentucky Student Privacy Act, H.B. 141, 2017-2018 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess (Ky. 2017); Student Physical Privacy Act, H.B. 41, 90th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2017); Montana Locker Room Privacy Act, H.B. 609, 65th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2017). Many of these bills are based on model legislation
drafted by the Alliance Defending Freedom, an organization that claims to "pro-
mote[ I religious liberty and marriage and the family" and frequently undertakes
litigation and legislative campaigns to oppose LGBT rights. See Regarding H.B.
15-1081 Concerning the Protection of Physical Privacy in Sex-Segregated Locker
Rooms Before the H. Comm.L On State, Veterans & Military Affairs, 70th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Colo. 2015) (statement of M. Norton, Senior Counsel, Alliance Defending
Freedom), http: / /www.leg.state.co.us/CLICS/CLICS2015A/commsumm.nsf/
b4a3962433b52fa787256e5f00670a71/4f3a48ec0a54330687257de2005e3f8c/
$FILE/ 15HouseState02O4AttachC.pdf#page=5 [https: //perma.cc/2WSP-WT4M]
[hereinafter "Norton Statement"].
13 In the 2017 legislative session, six states considered legislation that would
preempt municipal and county-level antidiscrimination laws, another sixteen
considered bills to restrict access to sex-segregated facilities on the basis of"bio-
logical sex" rather than gender identity, and fourteen considered legislation that
would restrict transgender students' ability to use school facilities that accord
with their gender identity. Joellen Kralik, 'Bathroom Bill' Legislative Tracking,
NAT'L CONF. ST. LEG. (July 28, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/-
bathroom-bill-legislative-tracking635951130.aspx [https://perma.cc/M'TT6-
GR83].
14 Some proposed bills also impose criminal penalties on people who use a
public bathroom or other facility that does not match their sex assigned at birth or
impose civil liability on entities that permit people to use gendered facilities that
1722 [Vol. 104:1719
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the Student Privacy Protection Act and are supposed to protect
young women's dignity and physical integrity.15 Proponents
claim that these bills are a necessary, or even an emergency,
response to a threat created by the LGBT community's demand
for protection from discrimination in employment and public
accommodations: the threat that such antidiscrimination pro-
tections will facilitate men entering women's bathrooms.16
They argue that these measures must be enacted to protect
women and girls from grave privacy violations. 17
Traditionalists have also challenged transgender-inclusive
policies in court by claiming that schools or employers who
allow transgender people to use facilities that match their gen-
der identity have violated cisgender people's privacy. 18 These
arguments have taken a number of forms: substantive due
process claims to bodily privacy; 19 a claim that protecting pri-
vacy is an important state interest that justifies sex discrimina-
tion or provides a rational basis for it; 20 and arguments that
the Civil Rights Act's Title VII and Title IX prohibitions on sex
discrimination could not possibly include a right for trans-
do not conform to their birth-assigned sex. See, e.g., H.B. 244, 64th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Wyo. 2017), https://www.wyoleg.gov/2017/Introduced/HB0244.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UWT2-CVKC] (redefining the crime of public indecency to in-
clude "knowingly us[ing] a public bathroom or changing facility designated to be
used by a specific sex which does not correspond to the person's sex identified at
birth by the person's anatomy"); H.B. 1612 § 2.2-3908, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va.
2017), https://lis.virginla.gov/cgi-bin/legp6O4.exe?171+fui+HB1612 [https://
perma.cc/975Q-97HJ] (proposing to impose civil liability on entities that permit
people to use gendered facilities that do not conform to the sex they were assigned
at birth).
15 Proponents of such efforts refuse to accept that transgender women are
women too, women whose privacy interests will be directly harmed by such legis-
lation. See infra Part III.
16 See infgra Part II.
17 The Alliance Defending Freedom, for example, has argued that a state law
forbidding discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation has "significantly
increased public safety risk primarily to women and to children" and as a result
"[plarents are concerned about the safety and privacy of their children," and
"husbands are justifiably concerned about the safety and privacy of their
spouses." Norton Statement, supra note 12.
18 See, e.g., Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 276 F. Supp. 3d 324, 330, 376
(E.D. Pa. 2017) (where plaintiffs alleged that their school district's practice of
allowing transgender students to use bathrooms and locker rooms consistent
with their gender identity violated their right to privacy under the Fourteenth
Amendment and Pennsylvania common law).
19 See icL at 376.
20 See, e.g., Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of Com. Sys. of Higher Educ., 97
F. Supp. 3d 657, 668 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (where defendants claimed that under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, policies directed at trans-
gender individuals need only be rationally based in concern for privacy to pass
constitutional muster).
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gender people to use sex-segregated facilities that accord with
their gender identity.2 1 While some courts have rejected these
arguments, others have been receptive to them.
22
By examining the privacy concerns asserted in opposition
to antidiscrimination protections for LGBT people through the
lens of legal privacy theory, this Article demonstrates that at-
tempts to exclude transgender women from women's facilities
do not protect women's privacy or safety. Indeed, these efforts
are not only unhelpful to women's interests, they are harmful.
Excluding transgender women from women's bathrooms on
privacy grounds hurts all women, including cisgender women.
It does so by reifying dangerous sex stereotypes that have been
used to exclude women from public life and to justify sexual
violence. Efforts to exclude transgender people from facilities
that accord with their gender identity are better understood as
struggles to oppose LGBT rights and maintain traditional sex
and gender roles rather than as a defense of privacy. Far from
protecting women and girls, the privacy arguments being made
to oppose LGBT rights perpetuate negative stereotypes about
women and men, undermining sex equality and making people
more vulnerable to discrimination, mistreatment, and assault.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses how pri-
vacy concerns have historically been used to justify discrimina-
tion against women and their exclusion from public life and
cautions that a stated concern for protecting privacy may be
used to limit, rather than expand, women's rights. Part II ex-
plains how privacy claims have arisen in legal disputes about
transgender people's access to facilities that accord with their
gender identity. Part III describes the theoretical justifications
for privacy rights advanced by scholars in the field and exam-
ines whether the asserted privacy interest in excluding trans-
gender women from women's bathrooms fits the existing
theoretical framework. I argue that the claimed privacy inter-
est in excluding transgender people is a poor fit with privacy
doctrine and cannot form a legally cognizable interest. In fact,
it is transgender people facing such exclusions who have genu-
21 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of
Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850, 865-66 (S.D. Ohio 2016).
22 Compare, e.g., Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518, 528 (3d
Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2636 (2019) (holding that a school district's
policy of allowing transgender students access to bathrooms and locker rooms
that reflected their gender Identity served a compelling state interest in not dis-
criminating against transgender students and was narrowly tailored to advance
that interest), with Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 672 (rejecting a transgender
student's equal protection claims).
[Vol. 104:17191724
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ine privacy concerns worthy of legal protection. Part IV argues
that, far from protecting women and girls, accepting a privacy
rationale for excluding transgender women from women's facil-
ities reifies pernicious stereotypes about women being seduc-
tive objects who tempt men into sexual violence.
I
THE HISTORICAL USE OF PRIVACY AS A PRETEXT FOR
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN
While the constitutional right to privacy has been used to
win important advances in women's rights, the concept of pri-
vacy has a checkered history for women. In the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, privacy was more frequently invoked
by courts to deny women's rights than to uphold them. In the
Victorian era, rapid industrialization moved the locus of pro-
duction from the home to the factory.23 The nineteenth cen-
tury saw huge numbers of women joining the public workforce
in mills, factories, and other industrial settings. For example,
young white women were the majority of workers in textile mills
from their founding in Lowell, Massachusetts in 1822.24 Wo-
men also joined social reform and suffrage movements and
began to participate in public social settings such as theaters.
But this caused consternation. "[Any move by women outside
the domestic sphere was viewed by many people with serious
concern, for the growing number of women in public spaces
evidenced a 'living contradiction of the cult of true
womanhood.'"2 5
The notion of "separate spheres" developed, in which wo-
men were seen to belong in the secluded, protected setting of
the home, while men alone were suited for the challenges and
opportunities of public life. 2 6 The Victorian "cult of true wo-
manhood" held that (white) women were more pure and virtu-
ous than men.2 7 It thus cast (white) women as guardians of
morality who had the duty to civilize men and nurture the next
generation. Simultaneously, this ideology viewed (white) wo-
men as delicate, fragile creatures incapable of withstanding
23 CATHERINE CLINTON, THE OTHER CML WAR 18 (1984).
24 Id. at 27; Terry S. Kogan, Sex-Separation i Public Restrooms: Law, Archi-
tecture, and Gender, 14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 21 n.78 (2007).
25 Terry S. Kogan, Sex Separation: The Cure for Victorian Social Anxiety, in
TOILET: PUBLIC RESTROOMS AND THE POLITICS OF SHARING 147 (Harvey Molotch &
Laura Noren eds., 2010) (quoting CYNTHIA EAGLE RussETr, SEXUAL SCIENCE: THE
VICTORIAN CONSTRUCTION OF WOMANHOOD 10 (1989)).
26 CLINTON, supra note 23, at 18-19.
27 Kogan, supra note 25, at 146-47.
20191 1725
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hard physical or intellectual labor. Women were viewed as
weak and childlike. They were to be cossetted at home, sepa-
rate and apart from modem industrial life. 28 Domesticity thus
became women's highest calling. Women were expected to be
self-sacrificing, pious, gentle, and nurturing, tending to the
needs of others in the home.
The private setting of the home was not necessarily a safe
and protected place for women, however. A man had the right
to control his wife and dictate her behavior. A husband could
legally subject his wife to physical punishment if she failed to
obey him.29 The right of chastisement empowered men to
strike their wives, although only a stick no wider than a thumb
was supposed to be used.30 But to preserve the home as a
private repose, the law refused to intervene when husbands
comnmitted domestic violence against their wives.3 ' Until the
late twentieth century, a husband could also legally force his
wife to have sex with him against her will. The marital rape
exemption was recognized at common law and every state also
had a statute codifying it. 32 Marriage was an absolute defense
to any rape charge, no matter how brutal or horrific the viola-
tion.3 3 As Reva Siegel pointed out, "privacy talk was deployed
in the domestic violence context to enforce and preserve au-
thority relations between man and wife." 34 Far from protecting
28 "Women who move around outside the home, especially if it is out in the
city versus, say, in a rural village, are 'out of control,' a phrase significantly also
used of the prostitute and for both the urologically and morally 'incontinent' (a
word with many meanings)." Clara Greed, Creating a Nonsexist Restroom, in
TOILET: PUBLIC RESTROOMS AND THE POLITICS OF SHARING, supra note 25, at 121.
29 Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy,
105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2123 (1996) ("As master of the household, a husband could
command his wife's obedience, and subject her to corporal punishment or 'chas-
tisement' if she defied his authority.").
30 Beirne Stedman, Right of Husband to Chastise Wife, 3 VA. L. REG. 241, 243
(1917).
31 See, e.g., State v. Black, 60 N.C. (Win.) 262, 267 (1864) ("[Ulnless some
permanent injury be inflicted, or there be some excess of violence, or such a
degree of cruelty as shows that it is inflicted to gratify his own bad passions, the
law will not invade the domestic forum or go behind the curtain [to criminally
prosecute a husband for assaulting his wife]. It prefers to leave the parties to
themselves, as the best mode of inducing them to make the matter up and live
together as man and wife should.").
32 Jessica Kiarfeld, A Striking Disconnect: Marital Rape Law's Failure to Keep
Up with Domestic Violence Law, 48 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 1819, 1819 (2011).
33 Cf. Commonwealth v. Fogerty, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 489, 490 (1857) (noting
that a defendant could always defend himself against a charge of rape by showing
that "the woman on whom it was charged to have been committed was his wife").
34 Siegel, supra note 29, at 2158.
[Vol. 104:17191726
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women, the "ideology of the private sphere" created "a right of
men 'to be let alone' to oppress women one at a time."35
At the same time, women's efforts to attain a place in pub-
lic life were "fought every step of the way, often with the com-
plicity of the courts[.]"36 The Supreme Court infamously held
in Bradwell v. Illinois that a woman could be denied a license to
practice law solely on the basis of sex.37 Justice Bradley wrote
that this holding was justified because "the civil law, as well as
nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the
respective spheres and destinies of man and woman .... The
natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of
civil life." 38 In an era when the Court regularly struck down
economic regulations designed to protect workers claiming
they impinged upon a natural right to contract, it made an
exception for legislation targeting women. The hours that wo-
men worked could be limited because "her physical structure
and a proper discharge of her maternal functions-having in
view not merely her own health, but the well-being of the race-
justify legislation to protect her from the greed as well as the
passion of man.... The two sexes differ in structure of body, in
the functions to be performed by each, in the amount of physi-
cal strength, in the capacity for long continued labor[.]"
39 So
laws forbidding women from working certain hours were per-
missible, even though such a statute to protect male workers
would not pass constitutional muster. Women were delicate,
and their most important responsibility was to bear healthy
children. The state was therefore justified in excluding them
from certain occupations to protect their physical, spiritual,
and moral well-being. For example, in a challenge to a statute
that forbade women from obtaining liquor licenses, the Su-
preme Court held: "The fact that women may now have
achieved the virtues that men have long claimed as their pre-
rogatives and now indulge in vices that men have long prac-
ticed, does not preclude the States from drawing a sharp line
35 Catherine MacKinnon, Roe v. Wade: A Study in Male Ideology, InABORON:
MORAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 49, 53 (Jay L. Garfield & Patricia Hennessey eds.,
1984).
36 Teresa Godwin Phelps, Gendered Space and the Reasonableness Standard
in Sexual Harassment Cases, 12 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 265, 279
(1998).
37 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 136 (1872).
38 Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
39 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422-23 (1908).
2019] 1727
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between the sexes, certainly, in such matters as the regulation
of the liquor traffic."
40
It was against this backdrop that the practice of segregat-
ing bathrooms by gender developed. The first law mandating
sex-segregated water closets was enacted by the Massachu-
setts legislature in 1887.41 It required that "suitable and
proper wash-rooms and water-closets shall be provided for fe-
males where employed, and the water closets used by females
shall be separate and apart from those used by males."
42 As
Terry S. Kogan points out, "policymakers were motivated to
enact toilet separation laws aimed at factories as a result of
deep social anxieties over women leaving their homes-their
appropriate 'separate sphere'-to enter the work force.
'" 43 It
was not just bathrooms or locker rooms that were segregated
by gender: separate "ladies lounges" were created in public
spaces to give women a home-like setting where they could
retreat.44 Some public institutions also had designated access
points just for women, such as a "ladies' window" in the San
Francisco post office.4 5 Many workplaces failed to provide
restrooms for women, however, sending a powerful signal that
they were not welcome. The only bathroom on the floor of the
U.S. Senate, for example, was labelled "Senators Only," but
was also men only.4 6 Women serving in the Senate were forced
to use a bathroom in the visitors' gallery until 1993.
4 7
While it is comfortable to see such practices as anachronis-
tic vestiges of a prior era, the refusal to provide bathrooms has
continued to be used to exclude women from employment op-
portunities. "The basic nature of the need to eliminate waste,
and the humiliation entailed in having to overcome obstacles to
meet this need, make toilets the ideal choice, conscious or
subconscious, for those bent on excluding outsiders from white
40 Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948), abrogated by Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976).
41 Kogan, supra note 25, at 145.
42 Act of Mar. 24, 1887, ch. 103, §2, 1887 Mass. Acts 668 (quoted in Kogan,
supra note 25, at 145).
43 Kogan, supra note 25, at 145. But see W. Burlette Carter, Sexism in the
"Bathroom Debates": How Bathrooms Really Became Separated by Sex, 37 YALE L.
& POLY REv. 227, 279 (2018) (arguing that sex-segregation in bathrooms was in
effect much earlier; "even in Massachusetts, sex-separation in bathrooms was
well established long before 1887, not only informally, but by regulations").
44 Kogan, supra note 25, at 152.
45 Id.
46 Kathryn H. Anthony & Meghan Dufresne, Potty Parity in Perspective: Gen-
der and Family Issues in Planning and Designing Public Restrooms, 21 J. PLAN.




male preserves."48 Women going to work in male-dominated
fields like firefighting or mining have been confronted with
workplaces in which bathrooms are not provided at all or are
restricted to men only. Courts do not always recognize such
deprivations as actionable sex discrimination.49 In Hulbert v.
Memphis Fire Department, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that an employer's failure to provide shower facilities for
women supported Ms. Hulbert's prima facie discrimination
claim but she was not entitled to relief because there was no
real evidence of damages.50 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals found that deficient restrooms for women did not
support a hostile work environment claim. 51 Failing to provide
a woman worker with a portable toilet when she worked one-
fifth of a mile from the nearest restroom was also ruled not
severe enough to establish harassment claim.52 While the
practice of segregating bathrooms by gender may seem benign,
it "has negatively impacted women... by serving as a tool for
keeping them out of male-dominated professions."53
In the 1970s, the campaign to ratify the Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA) and write an explicit prohibition of sex dis-
crimination into the Constitution foundered in part because of
concerns about bathrooms.5 4 ERA opponent Phyllis Schlafly
claimed the amendment would be disastrous for women be-
cause it would, among other indignities, mandate unisex toi-
lets.5 5 Proponents insisted that the ERA would not infringe on
48 Taunya Lovell Banks, Toilets as a Feminist Issue: A True Story, 6 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 263, 285 (1990).
49 See Mary Anne Case, All the World's the Men's Room, 74 U. CHI. L. REV.
1655, 1655 (2007) (describing the Seventh Circuit's rejection in DeClue v. Central
Illinois Light Co., 223 F.3d 434 (7th Cir. 2000), of the claim that a failure to provide
adequate female restroom facilities constituted sexual harassment).
50 No. 99-5358, 2000 WL 924318, at *5 (6th Cir. June 28, 2000).
51 Kline v. City of Kan. City Fire Dep't, 175 F.3d 660, 669 (8th Cir. 1999).
52 Austin v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 193 F.3d 992, 994 (8th Cir. 1999).
53 C.J. Griffin, Workplace Restroom Policies in Light of New Jersey's Gender
Identity Protection, 61 RUTGERS L. REv. 409, 425 (2009).
54 Petula Dvorak, The Equal Rights Amendment Has Languishedfor Decades.
Virginia Must Put It Over the Top, WASH. PosT (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/local/the-equal-rights-amendment-has-languished-for-decades-
virginia-must-put-it- over-the-top/20 18/11/29/c454c8f4-f3f0- 11 e8-80d0-
f7e 1948d55f4-story.html?utmterm=.8738620dffb9 [https: //perma. cc/QY5M-
P7XC].
55 Schlafly also argued that ratification of the ERA would lead to women
serving in combat and marriage being opened to same-sex couples. Both ideas
caused great anxiety at the time but have since come to pass without tremendous
social upheaval (and without ratification of the ERA). See Emily Crockett, The





anyone's privacy;5 6 ERA supporter Judy Carter called Schla-
fly's bathroom claim a "malicious rumor" that preyed upon the
"deep, unspoken fear people have about bathrooms."
5 7 Despite
these efforts to reassure the public, however, concerns about
possible negative consequences of the ERA ultimately pre-
vented its ratification. Anxiety about bathrooms was thus ef-
fectively deployed to prevent the enactment of explicit
constitutional protections against sex discrimination.
This troubling history suggests some reason to be leery of
calls to protect women by imposing even stricter gender segre-
gation policies in bathrooms and other facilities supposedly to
safeguard their privacy. As noted above, supposed concerns
about privacy could be a pretext for discrimination rather than
a genuine demand for women's rights. Opponents of LGBT
equality are increasingly seeking to roll back antidiscrimina-
tion protections forbidding sexual orientation and gender iden-
tity-based discrimination in public accommodations on the
basis that they foster privacy violations. Part II describes the
use of privacy concerns as a basis for opposition to antidis-
crimination laws.
II
THE DEPLOYMENT OF PRIVACY ARGUMENTS
TO OPPOSE LGBT EQUALITY
The argument that laws protecting LGBT people from sex-
ual orientation or gender identity discrimination violate wo-
men's privacy by allowing men to enter women's bathrooms
has become increasingly common in the last few years. Oppo-
nents now regularly attack proposals to ban sexual orientation
and gender identity discrimination in employment, housing, or
public accommodations by labelling them "bathroom bills,"
even when they do not explicitly address access to sex-segre-
gated facilities.58 The trope that antidiscrimination bans will
56 Timothy D. Schellhardt, Interpreting ERA: Legal Experts Say Plan to Outlaw
Sex Bias Is Widely Misunderstood, WALL ST. J. (May 16, 1979).
57 Unisex Bathroom Rumors, KINGMAN DAILY MINER, March 20, 1979, at 3,
https: //news.google.com/newspapers?nid=YGhAHpnIhDoC&dat= 19790320
&printsec=frontpage&hl=en [https: //perma.cc/LL95-M47T].
58 See Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Nonsense About Bathrooms: How Purported
Concerns over Safety Block LGBT Nondiscrimination Laws and Obscure Real Relig-
ious Liberty Concems, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 1373, 1375, 1387 (2017) (describ-
ing how opponents defeated Houston's Equal Rights Ordinance by "tagging it a
'bathroom bill'" and how people against a Pennsylvania antidiscrimination bill
similarly dubbed it a "Bathroom Bill"); see also Marie-Am~lie George, The LGBT
Disconnect: Politics and Perils of Legal Movement Formation, 2018 WIS. L. REV.
503, 504-05 (2018) ("[Rleligious conservatives discovered they could convince
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permit men to enter women's bathrooms and cause harm has
become "the principle rhetorical weapon against protecting
LGBT people from discrimination in public accommoda-
tions."59 Traditionalists urge both legislators and members of
the public to reject antidiscrimination legislation on the
grounds that doing so is the only way to protect women and
children who will otherwise fall victim to sexual predators.
When opponents describe the privacy harm that women
may suffer if transgender women are allowed into the women's
bathroom, they frequently raise the specter of sexual preda-
tion. But while many communities have had laws forbidding
discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity
for years, there have not been reports of sexual assaults in
bathrooms as a result.60 Twenty-one states,6 1 the District of
Columbia,62 and more than 200 cities and counties have
adopted nondiscrimination laws allowing transgender people to
access sex-segregated facilities that accord with their gender
identity.63 Police, prosecutors, and human rights commissions
in those communities have "consistently denied that there is
any correlation between such policies and a spike in as-
saults."64 The National Task Force to End Sexual Assault and
legislators and voters to repeal sexual orientation anti-discrimination laws by
highlighting that the statutes' gender identity provisions created ambiguity about
who could access sex-segregated facilities.").
59 Wilson, supra note 58, at 1386.
60 German Lopez, Anti-Transgender Bathroom Hysteria, Explained, Vox (Feb.
22, 2017), https://www.vox.com/2016/5/5/11592908/transgender-bathroom-
laws-rights [https://perma.cc/3QNU-WDJQ] ("[Elxperts and officials in 12 states
and 17 school districts with protections for trans people [reported] that they had
no increases in sex crimes after they enacted their policies."); What Experts Say,
NAT L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., https://transequality.org/what-experts-say
[https://perma.cc/F39G-QSND] (noting that while many states cities have
adopted laws protecting LGBT people from discrimination in public accommoda-
tions there has been "no increase in public safety incidents in restrooms in any of
these cities or states") (last visited Sept. 4, 2019).
61 See Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (2016) (amended by the
Civil Rights Act of 2005, Assemb. B. 1400); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-601
(2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64 (2017); Delaware Equal Accommodations
Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4501 (amended by Gender Identity Nondiscrimina-
tion Act of 2013, S.B. 97, 147th Gen. Assemb., (2013)); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 368-1; 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-102 (2019); IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.7 (2007);
ME. REv. STAT. tit. 5, § 4591; Fairness for All Marylanders Act of 2014, S.B. 212,
Reg. Sess. (Md. 2014).
62 D.C. CODE § 2-1402.31.
63 Cities and Counties with Non-Discrimination Ordinances that Include Gen-
der Identity, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/resources/cities-and-
counties-with-non-discrimination-ordinances-that-include-gender [https://per
ma.cc/U4WZ-YCAG] (last visited Sept. 4, 2019).
64 Emanuella Grinberg & Dani Stewart, 3 Myths That Shape the Transgender
Bathroom Debate, CNN (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/07/
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Domestic Violence noted that "[nIone of these jurisdictions
have seen a rise in sexual violence or other public safety is-
sues."65 A recent empirical study assessed whether reports of
safety or privacy violations in public restrooms were more fre-
quent in localities with gender identity nondiscrimination ordi-
nances for public accommodations and found no evidence that
privacy and safety in public restrooms changed as a result of
the passage of such laws.66 Rather, the evidence suggests that
"the passage of such nondiscrimination laws is not related to
the number or frequency of criminal incidents in such public
spaces," which are "exceedingly rare."
6 7
Despite the lack of empirical proof that permitting trans-
gender people to use the bathroom in accordance with their
gender identity will result in any increase in sexual assault or
violence, opponents of LGBT rights continue to argue that
grave privacy and safety violations will result if schools, busi-
nesses, and government are forbidden to discriminate based on
gender identity.68 On February 22, 2016, the City Council in
Charlotte, North Carolina, voted to amend a city ordinance
forbidding public accommodation discrimination based on
race, color, religion, national origin, or sex, to add "sexual ori-
entation, gender identity, [and] gender expression."69 The mea-
health/transgender-bathroom-law-facts-myths/index.html [https://perma.cc/
M82R-EDHG].
65 National Consensus Statement on Behalf of Anti-Sexual Assault and Domes-
tic Violence Organizations in Support of Full and Equal Access for the Transgender
Community, NAT'L TASK FORCE TO END SExUAL AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WO-




66 Amira Hasenbush, Andrew R. Flores & Jody L. Herman, Gender Identity
Nondiscrimination Laws in Public Accommodations: A Review of Evidence Regard-
ing Safety and Privacy in Public Restrooms, Locker Rooms, and Changing Rooms,
16 SExuALIrY RES. & SOC. POL'Y 70, 80 (2019).
67 Id.
68 As Tobias Wolff points out, opponents have repeatedly used this tactic to
reduce support for antidiscrimination legislation. "With striking consistency, op-
ponents have invoked anxiety over the bathroom-who uses bathrooms, what
happens in bathrooms, and what traumas one might experience while occupying
a bathroom-as the reason to permit discrimination in the workplace, housing,
and places of public accommodation. Tobias Barrington Wolff, Civil Rights Reform
and the Body, 6 HARv. L. & POLY REV. 201, 201 (2012).
69 Charlotte, N.C., Ordinance 7056 (Feb. 22, 2016); Steve Harrison, Charlotte
City Council Approves LGBT Protections in 7-4 Vote, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Feb. 22,
2016), http: //www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-government/arti-
cle61786967.html [https://perma.cc/DWP7-WFSG; Greg Lacour, HB2: How





sure met with fierce opposition, which focused on its
protections for transgender people. In particular, opponents
claimed that the ordinance would lead to privacy and safety
violations in bathrooms because the law permitted transgender
people to use bathroom facilities that accorded with their gen-
der identity rather than their sex assigned at birth.70 Although
the ordinance outlawed discrimination in public accommoda-
tions generally, including in taxis, bars, restaurants, and
transportation,7 1 opponents labeled the bill a "bathroom ordi-
nance," and were remarkably successful in reframing debate
about the law to focus solely on bathroom privacy.72 Indeed,
the bill came to be commonly referred to as "the bathroom
ordinance."7 3 After lengthy public debate, the measure was
adopted, but the controversy continued. State lawmakers in
the North Carolina legislature expressed outrage about the law
immediately upon its enactment. North Carolina Senate Presi-
dent pro tempore Phil Berger claimed that the ordinance would
"allow men to share public bathrooms with little girls and wo-
men," and asked, "[hlow many fathers are now going to be
forced to go to the ladies' room to make sure their little girls
aren't molested?"74 North Carolina House Speaker Tim Moore
similarly stated that the law needed to be changed "to protect
children, who from the time they've been potty trained, know to
go into the bathroom of their [Glod-given appropriate gender.
" 75
The day after the Charlotte City Council adopted the anti-
discrimination ordinance, North Carolina lawmakers called for
a special legislative session to convene so that they could un-
dertake legislative intervention to "correct [Charlotte's] radical
course."76 The North Carolina state legislature held a special
70 Harrison, supra note 69 (noting that the "bathroom provision sparked the
most opposition, with opponents mostly worried about the safety of women and
girls in a public bathroom with people who were born male").
71 Charlotte, N.C., Ordinance 7056 (Feb. 22, 2016).
72 See Charlotte Council Repeals 'Bathroom' Ordinance that Led to HB2; Sets




74 Jim Morrill, Republican Lawmakers Blast Charlotte's LGBT Protections,
CHARLO-rE OBSERVER (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/
politics-governnent/article63864677.html [https: //perma.cc/4XXE-DK95].
75 Amy Elliott, Group Rallies Against Proposed Special Session on Non-Dis-
crimination Ordinance, SPECTRUM NEWS, https://spectrumlocalnews.com/nc/tri-
angle- sandhills /news/ 20 16 /03 / 17 / group-rallies- against-proposed- special-
session-on-charlotte-s-non-discrimination-ordinance [https: //perma.cc/P4FW-
HWAT] (last visited Jan. 8, 2019).
76 Andrea Fox, The Latest: House Speaker Supports Charlotte Vote Override,
EFFICIENTGOV (Feb. 23, 2016), https://efflcientgov.com/blog/2016/02/23/the-
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session on March 23, 2016 to debate House Bill 2, the Public
Facilities Privacy & Security Act (H.B. 2).77 State representa-
tives opined that the bill "sends a message to these municipali-
ties who have been taken over by the liberal, homosexual,
prohomosexual ideology that we are going to stick up for tradi-
tional values"78 and was necessary to prevent a "pervert [from]
walk[ing] into a bathroom [when] my little girls are in there."
79
The special session lasted only one day, and the bill was passed
fewer than twelve hours after it was introduced with almost no
opportunity for public comment and little debate.8 0 H.B. 2
amended North Carolina's General Statutes to mandate that all
public agencies and executive branch agencies, including local
school boards and the University of North Carolina, designate
all multiple occupancy bathrooms and changing facilities for
use by persons "based on their biological sex."8 ' The bill de-
fined biological sex as "the physical condition of being male or
female, which is stated on a person's birth certificate."82 H.B. 2
also barred municipalities from enacting antidiscrimination
protections under local law and reserved the right to pass non-
discrimination legislation solely to the state government. This
stripped LGBT people of protection from public accommoda-
tions discrimination because North Carolina state law forbade
discrimination only on the basis of disability, race, religion,
color, national origin or "biological sex" and offered no protec-
tion from bias based on sexual orientation, gender identity, or
gender expression.8 3 Despite H.B. 2's broad sweep, President
pro tempore of the North Carolina Senate Phil Berger defended
latest-house-speaker-supports-charlotte-vote-override/ [https://perma.cc/
LN4B-QATF].
77 First Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 32, Car-
caflo v. McCrory, No. 1: 16-cv-00236-TDS-JEP (M.D.N.C. Apr. 21, 2016).
78 Id. at 35-36.
79 Id. at 35.
80 Id at 32-33.
81 Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act of 2016, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-
521.2 (2016) [hereinafter H.B. 2].
82 Id.
83 See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-422.11 (effective March 23, 2016 to March
29, 2017). Before the passage of H.B. 2, North Carolina state law only forbade
public accommodation discrimination based on disability under N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 168A-6 (2015). H.B. 2 enacted the Equal Access to Public Accommodations Act,
which expanded the protected classifications to include race, religion, color, na-
tional origin and "biological sex," but did not include sexual orientation or gender
identity. H.B. 2 § 143-422.11, supra note 81. The Equal Access to Public Accom-
modations Act was repealed with the passage of House Bill 142, An Act to Reset
S.L. 2016-3, § S.L. 2017-4, § 1 (effective March 30, 2017). Currently, North Caro-
lina law forbids discrimination in public accommodations only on the basis of
disability. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168A-6 (2015).
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the law as a "bathroom safety bill" that has "nothing to do with
discrimination and everything to do with protecting women's
privacy and keeping men out of girls' bathrooms."84 Similarly,
North Carolina House Speaker Tim Moore claimed the bill was
"about privacy" because the Charlotte ordinance "would have
allowed a man to go into a bathroom, locker or any changing
facility, where women are-even if he was a man.... Obviously
there is the security risk of a sexual predator, but there is the
issue of privacy."
8 5
House Bill 2 generated enormous controversy following its
enactment. Rallies in response to the law attracted hundreds
of protesters.8 6 Businesses, religious organizations, and com-
munity groups condemned the provision. Companies and per-
formers opposed to the law cancelled business expansions and
entertainment events in the state.87 Sporting events were also
affected; the National Basketball Association moved its All-Star
Game from Charlotte in 2017, while the NCAA removed seven
championships that were to be held in North Carolina during
the 2016-17 academic year.88 The cost to the state in lost
84 Jeff Reeves, NC Weighs Impact on HB2 After US Court Overturns Virginia
Transgender Bathroom Rule, CBS17 NEWS (Apr. 19, 2016), http://www.cbsl7
.com/news/court-overturns-virginia-schools-transgender-bathroom-rule/
1080696678 [https: //perma.cc/94X2-7VDMI.
85 Tal Kopan & Eugene Scott, North Carolina Governor Signs Controversial
Transgender Bill, CNN (Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/03/23/
politics/ north-carolina-gender-bathrooms-bill/index.html [perma.cc/EDC5-
KLDQI.




87 See Jana Kasperkevic, PayPal Cancels North Carolina Center in Protest of
Law That 'Denies Equal Rights,' GuARDIAN (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.theguar-
dian.com/technology/2016/apr/05/paypal-cancels-north-carollna-center-char-
lotte-law-lgbt-discrimination [https://perma.cc/UU5U-M4GU] (stating that
PayPal cancelled plans for a new operation center In Charlotte, North Carolina,
following the passage of HB2); Roger Yu, Deutsche Bank to Freeze New Jobs in NC
Due to New Transgender Law, USA TODAY (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.usatoday
.coM/story/money/2016/04/12/deutsche-bank-freeze-new-jobs-nc-due-new-
transgender-law/82932994/ [https://perma.cc/JYZ7-UWSL (reporting that
Deutsche Bank announced it would "freeze plans to create 250 new jobs at its
software center in Cary, N.C." because of HB2); Decision on Whether to Boycott
N.C. Over HB2 is Tough Cal for Some Musicians, McCLATcHY REGIONAL NEWS (Apr.
24, 2016), https://www.joumalnow.com/news/state/decision-on-whether-to-
boycott-n-c-over-hb-is/article_1 eb56 1 Od-3890-50e5-9534-9dc0dc 115129.htrnl
[https://perma.cc/W35U-WNRL] (describing how Bruce Springsteen, Ringo
Starr, Boston, Ani DiFranco, Pearl Jam, and Cirque du Soleil cancelled perform-
ances in the state in protest over the law).
88 Michael Gordon et. al., Understanding HB2: North Carolina's Newest Law
Solidifies State's Role in Defining Discrimination, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Mar. 30,
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revenue from canceled conventions, concerts, and sporting
events was estimated to be $196 million, and the Associated
Press estimated that the state would lose $3.76 billion in reve-
nue by the end of 2028 as a result of the law.89 In November
2016, Republican Governor Pat McCrory lost his bid for reelec-
tion to Democrat Roy Cooper; his support of H.B. 2 was widely
believed to be one of the reasons for his defeat.90 Facing in-
tense pressure to change the law in order to end boycotts
against the state, particularly by the NCAA, the North Carolina
legislature replaced H.B. 2 with H.B. 142 in March 2017.91
The new law was pitched as a repeal of H.B. 2, but it did
not undo all the damage the original bill had done to LGBT
people in North Carolina. The replacement statute forbids
state agencies, offices, boards, and branches of government,
including universities and local school boards, from regulating
"access to multiple occupancy restrooms, showers, or changing
facilities," leaving such power solely in the hands of the North
Carolina state legislature.92 No public institution in North Car-
olina can adopt a policy allowing transgender people to use sex-
segregated facilities in accordance with their gender identity.
93
But in July 2017, the North Carolina governor and other execu-
tive branch officials entered into a consent decree holding that
2017), http: //www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-government/arti-
cle68401147.html [https: //perma.cc/6ELR-G53W].
89 'Bathroom Bill' to Cost North Carolina $3.76B, AP Analysis Finds, NBC
(Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/bathroom-bill-
cost-north-carolina-3- 76b-ap-analysis-flnds-n738866 [https://perma.cc/
GWQ4-BKEN]; see also Jack B. Harrison, To Sit or Stand& Transgender Persons,
Gendered Restrooms, and the Law, 40 U. HAw. L. REv. 49, 99 (2017) (noting that
"[iln the months following the passage of H.B. [2], North Carolina faced a signifi-
cant financial backlash").
90 See, e.g., Associated Press & Ariel Zilber, North Carolina Lawmakers Set to
Repeal Controversial 'Bathroom Bill' Which Requires Transgender People to Use
Restrooms of Sex on Birth Certificate (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.dalymail.co
.uk/news/article-4048630/Incoming-governor- says-North-Carolina-repeal-
LGBT-law.html [https://perma/cc/C55F-56YU] (noting that McCrory's election
defeat was "blamed partly on the controversial [HB2] law"); Chris Fitzsimon, Mc-
Crory, the Mayor Who Never Figured Out How to Be Governor, WINSTON-SALEM J.
(N.C.) A16, Dec. 10, 2016, at A16 (opining that McCrory "actually lost the race [for
reelection] on March 23 when he signed the sweeping anti-LGBT law HB2").
91 Jason Hanna, Madison Park & Eliott C. McLaughlin, North Carolina Re-
peals 'Bathroom Bill', CNN (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/30/
politics/north-carolina-hb2-agreement/index.html [https: //perma.cc/GFS6-
XPN5].
92 Steve Harrison, Does the HB2 Compromise Fix the State's Bathroom Di-






the new statute cannot be construed "to prevent transgender
people from lawfully using public facilities in accordance with
their gender identity."94 As such, transgender people in North
Carolina are no longer barred from using bathrooms that ac-
cord with their gender identity, even though North Carolina
schools, public universities, and other state institutions cannot
by law adopt transgender-inclusive policies regarding access to
sex-segregated facilities.95
But while H.B. 2's ban on bathroom usage has been lifted,
its restriction on local antidiscrimination ordinances remains.
The replacement law H.B. 142 prevents any city from "regulat-
ing private employment practices or regulating public accom-
modations" until December 2020, meaning that no city can
enact antidiscrimination protections for LGBT people.9 6 So
LGBT people in North Carolina have no legal protection against
discrimination at work or in public accommodations, and local
communities cannot create such protection until December
2020. Those opposed to the original Charlotte antidiscrimina-
tion ordinance clearly achieved their objective despite the mas-
sive mobilization against H.B. 2 and its purported repeal.
A similar story played out in Texas. In 2014, the City
Council in Houston, Texas, passed the Houston Equal Rights
Ordinance (HERO), which prohibited discrimination in employ-
ment, housing, and public accommodation on the basis of a
variety of traits, including sexual orientation and gender iden-
tity. 9 7 Opponents of the law collected signatures to put HERO
to a public referendum.98 The ordinance was voted down on
November 3, 2015, after an intense campaign in which oppo-
nents of the ordinance "flooded radio and TV with ads saying
the law [gavel men dressed in women's clothing, including sex-
ual predators, the ability to enter a woman's restroom."99 Ad-
94 Consent Judgment and Decree at 5, Carcafto v. Cooper, No. 1:16-cv-
00236-TDS-JEP (M.D.N.C. July 23, 2019).
95 The decree is binding on the current governor and executive branch offi-
cials as well as their "successors, officers, and employees." Id.
96 Mark Joseph Stem, The HB2 'Repeal' Bill Is an Unmitigated Disaster for
LGBTQ Rights and North Carolina, SLATE (Mar. 30, 2017), http://www.slate.com/
blogs/outward/2017/03/30/hb2_repeal bill is a disaster for northcarolina_
and-lgbtqjrights.html [https: //perma.cc/W3KE-776D].
97 Katherine Driessen, Claims About Restroom Access Dominate HERO De-
bate, Hous. CHRON. (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/
houston-texas/houston/article/Claims-about-bathroom-access-dominate-
HERO-debate-6572325.php [https: //perma.cc/4LMB-NRJ4].
98 Alexa Ura, Houston Ordinance Vote a Test for LGOT Advocates, TEXAS TRIB-
UNE (Oct. 28, 2015), https://www.texastribune.org/2015/10/28/houston-ordi
nance-vote-next-big-test-lgbt-advocate/ [https: //perma.cc/7ZFB-HUP7].
99 Driessen, supra note 97.
20191 1737
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
vertisements by the group Texas Values Action showed a
transgender woman using a woman's locker room and posing a
threat to other women in the facility. 10 0 Another TV ad showed
a man bursting into a bathroom stall occupied by a young
girl. 10
After successfully repealing the Houston ordinance, Texas
conservatives came close to prohibiting municipal antidis-
crimination laws across the state. In 2017, the Texas Senate
passed Senate Bill 6, a proposed law similar to North Carolina's
H.B. 2 that would have preempted any local nondiscrimination
ordinance that allowed transgender people to use bathrooms in
accordance with their gender identity. 1 0 2 The bill also man-
dated that people use bathrooms in public schools, universi-
ties, and government buildings that match their "biological
sex."10 3 The stated purpose of the law was to ensure that "re-
sidents have a reasonable expectation of privacy when using
intimate facilities." 10 4 Sponsor Senator Kolkhorst said the bill
would "provide privacy and safety that Texans expect," and
would protect women and girls from being victims of voyeurs
and sexual predators in women's bathrooms. 105 The proposal
drew strong opposition from the business community, civil
rights groups, and law enforcement.10 6 Police chiefs from
around the state testified that enforcing the bill would draw law
enforcement resources away from more important priorities. '
0 7
Business leaders, including Fortune 500 companies based in
Texas, spoke out against the bill and claimed it would cost the
100 German Lopez, The Ugly Myth About Transgender People Opponents of a
Houston Civil Rights Law Used to Win, VOX (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.vox.com/
2015/10/20/9576343/hero-houston-bathroom-myth [https://perma.cc/M2XG-
AZ7U].
101 Drlessen, supra note 97.
102 Chris Johnson, Texas Senate Approves Anti-Trans Bathroom Bill, WASH.
BLADE (Mar. 15, 2017), https: //www.washingtonblade.com/2017/03/15/texas-
senate-approves-anti-trans-bathroom-bll/ [https://perma.cc/BE7B-KXGTI.
103 "Biological sex" is defined as "the physical condition of being male or fe-
male, which is stated on a person's birth certificate." S.B. 6 § 5, 85th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Tex. 2017), https://apps.texastribune.org/texas-bathroom-bill-anno-
tated/ [https://perma.cc/8WNE-6RPVI.
104 Id. § 1(4).
105 Jeremy Wallace, Bathroom Bill Wins Key Vote in Texas Senate, HOUS.
CHRON. (July 26, 2017), https://www.chron.com/news/politics/texas/article/






state $5.6 billion through 2026.108 The bill died in the Texas
House of Representatives after the House speaker refused to
refer it to a committee for consideration. 1 09 While the measure
did not pass in 2017, prominent lawmakers appeared commit-
ted to considering it again in future legislative sessions. Lieu-
tenant Governor Dan Patrick told reporters that the bill would
be back next session "[b]ecause the people will demand it,"
adding: 'The issue is not going to go away."' 110
Similar provisions have been debated across the country.
In the 2017 legislative session sixteen states considered legisla-
tion to restrict access to multiple occupancy bathrooms and
other sex-segregated facilities on the basis of sex assigned at
birth or "biological sex.""'1  Proposed legislation in another
fourteen states would have limited transgender students' ac-
cess to sex-segregated facilities that accord with their gender
identity at school.112 Six more states considered legislation
to preempt local antidiscrimination laws,113 although only
North Carolina passed such a law. 114 In November 2018, Mas-
sachusetts held a state-wide referendum on whether to retain a
law outlawing discrimination on the basis of gender identity in
public accommodations. 115 Opponents of the antidiscrimina-
tion measure argued that it should be repealed because it
108 Jonathan Berr, In Texas, It's Business Vs. the Bathroom Bill, CBS NEWS
(July 27, 2015), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/texas-bathroom-bfll-opposed-
by-businesses/ [https: //perma.cc/3KXQ-Q2YYI.
109 Alexa Ura, After Months of Controversy, Texas Bathroom Bill Dies Quietly,




110 David Montgomery & Manny Fernandez, Texas Bathroom Bill Dies Again,
Raising Republican Acrimony, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes
.com/2017/08/16/us/politics/texas-bathroom-bfll-dies-again-raising-republi-
can-acrimony.html [https://perma.cc/QS73-SFPNI.
111 These states are Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Minne-
sota, Missouri, Montana, New York, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. "Bathroom Bill" Legislative Tracking,
NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (July 28, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/
research/education/-bathroom-bill-legislative-tracking635951130.aspx [https: /
/perma.cc/3Y6T-5V45].
112 These states are Arkansas, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mis-
souri, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas and Virginia. Id.
113 These states are Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Texas and Virginia. Id.
114 House Bill 2 and then House Bill 142 discussed in detail infra.
115 Julie Moreau, Massachusetts Backs Transgender Rights in Historic State-





"eliminate[d] the right to privacy and safety in public
restrooms, locker-rooms, showers and changing facilities."
116
Massachusetts voters opted to retain the antidiscrimination
law, an encouraging result for transgender advocates in the
first state-wide referendum on transgender rights.117 LGBT-
rights activists feared that a vote to repeal the antidiscriniina-
tion protections would likely have prompted "a wave of similar
efforts to roll back protections in other states."1 1
While obtaining access to gender-appropriate bathrooms
may not be the number one goal for transgender advocates,'19
restrooms certainly are not a trivial issue for the transgender
community. Using the bathroom in public places presents se-
rious challenges for transgender people, who may face verbal
harassment, physical attacks, sexual assault, or being denied
access to the toilet altogether. This has serious life conse-
quences. "Transgender people are forced out of employment
and school because they are denied access to bathrooms."
120
In a recent survey of transgender Americans, 12% reported
being verbally harassed in public restrooms within the previ-
ous year, while 1% were physically attacked, and 1% were sex-
ually assaulted. 121 Another 9% said someone had denied them
access to a bathroom.122 Perhaps not surprisingly, trans-
gender people were afraid to use the bathroom; almost 60%
had avoided using public restrooms for fear of confrontation. 1
23
Just under a third of transgender people said they limited the
amount they ate or drank at least once in the previous year so
they did not need to use a public restroom. 124 This reluctance
116 KEEP MASSACHUSETrS SAFE, https://www.keepmasafe.org/ [https://perma
.cc/YJA3-CCZD] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
117 Moreau, supra note 115.
118 Id.
119 See Shannon Price Minter, "Djd Vu All Over Again": The Recourse to Biol-
ogy by Opponents of Transgender Equality, 95 N.C. L. REv. 1161, 1191 (2017)
(arguing that "if transgender advocates were able to choose their own priorities,
equal treatment in restrooms, in and of itself, would likely fall lower on the scale
than ensuring that transgender people are able to work, attend school, be free
from hate violence, have access to homeless shelters and medically necessary
care, secure accurate state-issued identification, raise children, obtain asylum,
and be protected from violence and abuse in prisons, jails, and detention
facilities").
120 Jennifer Levi & Daniel Redman, The Cross-Dressing Case for Bathroom
Equality, 34 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 133, 137 (2010).
121 SANDY E. JAMES ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, THE REPORT OF
THE 2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER SURVEY 226-27 (2016). The 2015 survey of 27,715
respondents reached an estimated 2% of the adult transgender population.
122 Id at 225.
123 Id at 228.
124 Id at 229.
[Vol. 104:17191740
PRIVACY AS PRETEXT
to use the bathroom often had health consequences: 8% of
transgender people surveyed reported that avoiding going to
the restroom had caused them to suffer a medical problem
such as a kidney or urinary tract infection, or another kidney-
related medical issue.'25 Unfortunately, transgender people
may view risking such health problems as the lesser of two
evils; as one commentator put it, for a transgender person, "the
public restroom is the closest thing to hell.'
126
When transgender people seek permission to use facilities
that accord with their gender identity at their school or work,
privacy concerns are often used to justify denying access. 1
27
Employers and school districts argue that permitting trans-
gender people to utilize the facility that matches their gender
identity, as opposed to their sex assigned at birth, will invade
the privacy of other, cisgender people.12 8 One transgender
woman resigned her position and filed suit after her employer
refused to allow her to use the women's bathroom at work. 1
29
The company claimed it was "attempting to accommodate the
conflicting concerns of [the transgender employee] and the fe-
male employees who expressed uneasiness about sharing their
restroom with a male."130 Despite a state law banning discrim-
ination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity,
the employer's action was deemed nondiscriminatory; the Min-
nesota Supreme Court noted that "the traditional and accepted
practice in the employment setting is to provide restroom facili-
ties that reflect the cultural preference for restroom designa-
tion based on biological gender" and therefore ruled that the
employer had not violated federal or state law forbidding dis-
crimination on the basis of sex or sexual orientation. '3' An-
125 ICL
126 MATr KAILEY, JUST ADD HORMONES: AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE TRANSSEXUAL
EXPERIENCE 143-44 (2005) (also noting that "[riestroom use is probably the biggest
single issue for a person transitioning on the job, and it's a major discussion point
in any trans support group").
127 Of course, people with a nonbinary gender identity who are neither male
nor female may not have access to any bathroom facility that accords with their
gender identity. See Jessica A. Clarke, They, Them, and Theirs, 132 HARV. L. REV.
894, 981 (2019) (noting that "the presence of a nonbinary person in either the
men's or women's restroom may result in harassment or even violence").
128 See, e.g., Goins v. W. Grp., 635 N.W.2d 717, 721 (Minn. 2001) (employer
refused to permit a transgender woman to use the women's bathroom because
cisgender women employees objected); Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Sch. Dist. v.
U.S. Dep't of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850, 874 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (school denied
transgender schoolgirl permission to use the girl's bathroom, citing concerns
about the privacy of cisgender girls).
129 Goins, 635 N.W.2d at 721.
130 Id.
'31 Id at 723.
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other court found an employer who fired a transgender woman
who refused to use the men's bathroom at work had not vio-
lated Title VII because the company "only required Plaintiff to
conform to the accepted principles established for gender-dis-
tinct public restrooms."13 2 Landlords have also refused to
lease space to tenants on similar grounds. In Hispanic Aids
Forum v. Estate of Bruno, a New York landlord refused to rent
office space to a nonprofit that served transgender clients.
133
The company said it declined to renew the organization's lease
because "other tenants in the building were complaining"
about the transgender clients' bathroom usage. 134 Again, de-
spite a local law forbidding discrimination based on gender
identity, the court found the landlord's actions were not con-
trary to law. It held the organization's transgender clients were
merely "prohibited from using the restrooms not in conform-
ance with their biological sex, as were all tenants."'
3 5
Employers who do permit transgender workers to use the
bathroom that accords with their gender identity may face pro-
tests or even litigation from cisgender employees. School
teacher Carla Cruzan sued the school district where she
worked after a transgender woman coworker was permitted to
use the women's bathroom there. 136 Cruzan argued that be-
cause of the school district's actions, she had been "forced to
share the restroom with a biological male."137 She believed her
coworker's use of the women's bathroom was "an invasion of
her 'personal privacy as a female,'" "humiliating to her as a
female," and a deprivation of her "sexual modesty."138 She
sued, alleging violations of Title VII. 139 The court granted the
defendant school district's motion for summary judgment,
however, holding that Cruzan had failed to establish that the
school had created a hostile work environment or subjected her
to religious discrimination. 
140
132 Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1000 (N.D. Ohio 2003)
(stating that the employer's conduct was not illegal because the employer "did not
require Plaintiff to conform her appearance to a particular gender stereotype" so
as to engage in illegal sex stereotyping).
133 Hispanic Aids Forum v. Estate of Bruno, 792 N.Y.S. 2d 43, 44 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2005).
134 Id. at 46.
135 Id. at 47.
136 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 3, Cruzan v. Minn. Pub. Sch. Sys., 165 F.
Supp. 2d 964 (D. Minn. 2001) (No. 01-3417), 2001 WL 34091359, at *3.
137 Id. at *6.
138 Id.
139 I& at *6.
140 Cruzan, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 966.
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Bathroom access issues have also arisen in public schools
with respect to transgender students. 141 High school student
Gavin Grimm told school officials that he was transgender
when he began his sophomore year of high school.14 2 They
were supportive and ensured he was treated as a boy by teach-
ers and staff. Gavin was also allowed to use the boy's restroom,
but some members of the community contacted the school
board looking to bar him from doing So. 14 3 A school board
member subsequently introduced a proposed resolution limit-
ing male and female restroom and locker room facilities to "the
corresponding biological genders."'44 Community members
who spoke in support of the proposed resolution during the
school board meeting claimed that "permitting [Gavin] to use
the boys' restroom would violate the privacy of other students
and would lead to sexual assault in restrooms."'145 Speakers
pointedly referred to Gavin using female pronouns and called
him "young lady."146 One man compared Gavin to a person
who was convinced he was a dog and wanted to urinate on fire
hydrants. 147
The school board ultimately adopted the proposed resolu-
tion and barred Gavin from the boys' bathroom.148 Gavin
avoided using the bathroom at school and repeatedly developed
painful urinary tract infections after holding his urine too
long. 149 Gavin filed suit, alleging that the school district had
discriminated against him based on sex in violation of Title IX
of the Civil Rights Act and denied his right to equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 150 He sought a preliminary
injunction to permit him to use the boy's bathroom during his
senior year of high school.15 1 The district court denied his
request, and while an appeals court reversed that decision and
an injunction was issued, the Supreme Court took certiorari
and overturned the appellate decision.152 The case was re-
141 See, e.g., G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. (Grimm/ ), 822
F.3d 709, 715 (4th Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017).
142 IdL
143 Id. at 716.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 716.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 727.
150 Id. at 731.
151 Id. at 732.




manded back to the district court. On August 9, 2019, the
district court ruled that the school board had discriminated
against Gavin in violation of Title IX and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
153
In a similar case, Jane Doe's mother informed the principal
of her elementary school that Jane was transgender the sum-
mer before she began first grade. 154 Jane's mother requested
that Jane be allowed to use the girls' bathroom at school and be
referred to using a female name. The school declined both
requests and required Jane to use the office restroom during
first grade, and a unisex restroom in the teachers' lounge dur-
ing her second-grade year.155 Jane faced harassment from
school staff and was bullied by other students. 15 6 She suffered
from "extreme anxiety and depression" because of her treat-
ment at school and was hospitalized for suicidal ideation.
157
The summer before fourth grade, Jane "became anxious about
returning to school" and attempted suicide. 158
The U.S. Department of Education notified the school dis-
trict that its actions violated Title IX, 159 and the district filed
suit, seeking an injunction forbidding the federal government
from compelling it to change its policies.160 Jane moved to
intervene and sought an injunction permitting her to use the
girls' bathroom. Jane's school district asserted that excluding
her from the girls' bathroom was necessary because of "the
153 Order Granting Summary Judgment, Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd.,
No. 4:15-cv-00054-AWA-RJK (E.D. Va. Aug. 9, 2019). The Court issued a declara-
tory judgment, awarding Gavin nominal damages of one dollar plus reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs. Id.
154 Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 208 F. Supp.
3d 850, 855 (S.D. Ohio 2016).
155 Id. at 856-57.
156 ICL
157 Id. at 856.
158 Id.
159 The Obama administration took the position that excluding a transgender
child from the bathroom that accords with her gender identity constituted sex
discrimination that violated Title IX. In May 2016, the Department of Education
issued a "Dear Colleague" to school districts notifying them that to comply with
Title IX, "[wihen a school provides sex-segregated activities and facilities, trans-
gender students must be allowed to participate in such activities and access such
facilities consistent with their gender identity." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DEAR COL-
LEAGUE LETTER ON TRANSGENDER STUDENTS 3 (May 13, 2016), https://www.justice
.gov/opa/ffile/850986/download [https://perma.cc/6XWQ-8PJ3]. The Trump
administration rescinded the guidance on February 22, 2017, saying there "must
be due regard for the primary role of the States and local school districts in
establishing educational policy." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DEAR COLLEAGUE LE=TER 1
(Feb. 22, 2017), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-
201702-title-ix.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3BV-7TV4].
160 Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Sch. Dist., 208 F. Supp. 3d at 859.
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dignity and privacy rights of other students" as well as "safety
issues and lewdness concerns."16 1 Three parents of other
Highland students submitted affidavits in support of the
School District's policies, including one whose foster children
had suffered sexual abuse. 162 She stated that, for her daugh-
ters, "the male anatomy is a weapon by which they were as-
saulted," and so "[tlhe very presence of a male, regardless of
whether he identifies as a female, in my daughters' restroom or
locker room. . . will almost certainly cause severe trauma that
will set back their emotional and psychological healing
process."16 3
A federal district court found that the school had likely
violated Title IX, and it entered a preliminary injunction per-
mitting Jane to use the girls' bathroom.164 The district ap-
pealed, but the parties agreed to dismiss the appeal following
the change in political administration and the Trump adminis-
tration's revocation of prior guidance requiring schools to allow
transgender students to use facilities consistent with their gen-
der identity. 165 Jane Doe and the school district subsequently
settled the lawsuit. 166
The asserted privacy concerns of cisgender people who ob-
ject to sharing bathrooms and other sex-segregated facilities
with transgender people have become the central basis for nu-
merous political and judicial decisions about LGBT equality
and restroom access. 167 Part III examines the privacy interests
that traditionalists claim are at stake when a transgender
woman uses a women's bathroom. To determine whether a
transgender person using the bathroom in accordance with her
gender identity actually threatens the privacy of other users, I
examine the claim using philosophical conceptions of privacy
advanced by legal scholars to justify a right to privacy protec-
tion under the law.
161 I& at 874.
162 Id. at 858.
163 IjL
164 1& at 854.
165 Doe ex reL Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist., No. 2:16-
CV-524, 2017 WL 3588727, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 21, 2017).
166 Order Granting 139 Sealed Motion for Approval of a Collaborative Resolu-
tion Agreement, Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., No.
2:16-CV-524 (S.D. Ohio June 21, 2018).
167 See, e.g., Whitaker ex reL Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd.
of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017) (affirming grant of preliminary injunction




Is THERE A LEGALLY COGNIZABLE PRIVACY INTEREST
IN TRANSGENDER EXCLUSION?
The task of evaluating the competing privacy claims of
transgender people who seek to use the bathroom in accor-
dance with their gender identity and cisgender objectors who
want to keep them out is made more difficult by the fact that
there is no scholarly unanimity on what privacy is or how far
the right to it extends. Much has been written about the con-
tradictory justifications for protecting privacy and the difficulty
of even agreeing upon a definition of privacy itself. 168 The real-
ity is that scholars disagree passionately about how to concep-
tualize our legal right to privacy. As philosopher Judith Jarvis
Thomson put it, "[p]erhaps the most striking thing about the
right to privacy is that nobody seems to have any very clear
idea what it is.' 16 9 Daniel Solove argues that privacy cannot be
distilled to a single unitary conception. 170 Rather, "[pirivacy is
too complicated a concept to be boiled down to a single es-
sence. Attempts to find such an essence often end up being too
broad and vague, with little usefulness in addressing concrete
issues." 171 There are, however, several fairly distinct schools of
thought regarding how the law should understand privacy. I
evaluate the issue of transgender bathroom access using six
prominent conceptions of privacy: the Right to Be Let Alone,
Limited Access, Intimacy, Control of Information, Personhood,
and Social Networks.
168 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 1 (2008) (describing privacy
as "a concept in disarray" and noting that "[pihilosphers, legal theorists, and
jurists have frequently lamented the great difficulty in reaching a satisfying con-
ception of privacy").
169 Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 295, 295
(1975).
170 SOLOVE, supra note 168 at 103.
171 Id. Solove instead advocates a taxonomic approach, identifying potentially
problematic activities that are frequently recognized as violating privacy. His
taxonomy of privacy problems identifies four basic groups of harmful activities: (1)
information collection, in which data is gathered about a person through surveil-
lance or interrogation; (2) information processing, when data concerning an indi-
vidual is used, stored or manipulated via aggregation, identification, insecurity,
secondary use, and exclusion; (3) information dissemination, when information
about a person is spread or disseminated through breach of confidentiality, dis-
closure, exposure, increased accessibility, blackmail, appropriation, and distor-
tion; and (4) invasion, which unlike the others does not necessarily involve
information, but occurs when a person's seclusion is disrupted through intrusion
or decisional interference. Id. at 103-05.
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A. The Right to Be Let Alone
Samuel Warren and then-activist Louis Brandeis described
the right to privacy as a "right to be let alone,"'72 in a ground-
breaking 1890 article often described as the foundation of
American privacy law. 173 They argued that privacy was under
threat from technological advances such as instant photogra-
phy and lurid press interest in publishing salacious stories
about people's intimate lives. Such developments, they
claimed, "have invaded the sacred precincts of private and do-
mestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to
make good the prediction that 'what is whispered in the closet
shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.'"'174 With privacy
under threat because "[glossip is no longer the resource of the
idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade," they argued
that there was a common law right to protection from the publi-
cation of personal information.175 In the past, the phrase
"right to be let alone" had been used to justify a tort remedy for
attempted physical touching, but Warren and Brandeis argued
that the common law also "secures to each individual the right
of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, senti-
ments, and emotions shall be communicated to others."176
Warren and Brandeis' article led to the recognition of vari-
ous privacy torts in almost every state.177 But the authors
argued for more than a tort remedy for people whose private
information had been published by a newspaper. They also
spoke of privacy as protecting an individual's "inviolate person-
ality" and argued that each person had a "general right to the
immunity of the person[-]the right to one's personality."178
Since then, the Supreme Court has frequently invoked this
conception of privacy in constitutional cases, including in sem-
inal rulings protecting citizens from wiretapping, 179 overturn-
ing prohibitions on contraception,18 0 and prohibiting making
172 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 6, at 193.
173 See, e.g., James H. Barron, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890): Demystifying a Landmark Citation 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
875, 877 (1979) (claiming there is "near unanimity among courts and commenta-
tors that the Warren-Brandeis conceptualization created the structural and juris-
prudential foundation of the tort of invasion of privacy").
174 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 6 at 195.
175 Id. at 196.
176 Id. at 198.
177 DANIEL J. SOLOVE ET AL., INFORMATN PRIVACY LAw 30-31 (2d. ed. 2006);
SOLOVE, supra note 168, at 16.
178 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 6, at 205, 207.
179 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
180 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972).
20191 1747
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
the mere possession of obscene material in the home a
crime.18 1 Justice Abe Fortas wrote that this "right to be let
alone" allowed a person "to live one's life as one chooses, free
from assault, intrusion or invasion except as they can be justi-
fied by the clear needs of community living under a government
of law." 1
82
In Doe v. Boyertown Area School District, four cisgender
high school students sued their school district after it permit-
ted two transgender students to use bathrooms and locker
rooms that accorded with their gender identity. 1
8 3 One of their
causes of action was a Pennsylvania state law privacy tort. The
plaintiffs claimed that they had been subjected to "intrusion
upon seclusion," which occurs when someone "intentionally
intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclu-
sion of another or his private affairs or concerns," in a manner
that would be "highly offensive to a reasonable person."'
8 4
Plaintiffs Joel Doe and Jack Jones claimed they had exper-
ienced such tortious conduct because they were "viewed in
their underwear by a member of the opposite sex," and Joel
Doe also "[saw] a member of the opposite sex in a state of
undress," after a transgender boy entered the locker room
when they were preparing for gym class and changed his
shirt. 18 5
Do cisgender people like these students who object to us-
ing a bathroom or locker room at the same time as a trans-
gender person have a viable claim that being required to do so
violates their right "to be let alone"? At first blush, it might
appear so. What the cisgender objector desires is seclusion
from the transgender person, and the essence of a "right to be
let alone" would seem to be protection for those who want isola-
tion or separation from others. But on closer inspection, the
cisgender students' claim is not really about protecting their
isolation, or the ability to separate themselves from other peo-
ple. After all, Joel Doe and Jack Jones did not object to sharing
the locker room with one another, or with other boys who are
not transgender. 1
8 6
181 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
182 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 413 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
183 Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518, 521 (3d Cir. 2018).
184 Id. at 537 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST.
1965)).
185 Brief of Appellants at 51, Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518




The Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the cisgender
students' claims were not viable and affirmed their dismissal
by the district court. 187 The court found that "the mere pres-
ence of a transgender individual in a bathroom or locker room
is not the type of conduct that would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person."188 This was partly because students in a
locker room are not seeking isolation or seclusion. Rather,
they "expect to see other students in varying stages of undress,
and they expect that other students will see them in varying
stages of undress."189 Further, the school did not permit any
and all students to use any locker room, regardless of gender
identity or sex assignment at birth. Transgender students were
allowed to use facilities in accordance with their gender identity
only after meeting with a counsellor as part of a case-by-case
assessment to determine whether to permit the student to use
facilities that accorded with their gender identity, instead of the
sex they were assigned at birth. 190 Joel Doe and Jack Jones's
claim that the boys' locker room was open to "member[s] of the
opposite sex" was thus misleading-only a transgender boy
was allowed to use the facility in addition to the cisgender boys,
and even he had to satisfy a counsellor that permitting him to
do so was appropriate.
All students at the Boyertown Area High School were also
given the option to change or use the toilet in completely pri-
vate, single-user facilities if they did not feel comfortable in the
locker room or multi-stall bathroom. 191 But the cisgender stu-
dents who sued the district argued that this was unsatisfac-
tory. 19 2 They argued that transgender students should be
limited to the facilities of their sex assigned at birth or the
single-user facilities. 193 In their view, this was the appropriate
solution because only "preserving the sex-specific communal
facilities to single-sex use would resolve all [plaintiffs'] privacy
concerns."'194 The cisgender plaintiffs in Boyertown were not
seeking to be left alone. They conceded that the single-user
facilities offered by the district would allow them to change or
toilet in solitude, but they nevertheless claimed that option was
187 Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch- Dist., 897 F.3d at 521.
188 Id. at 537.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 524.
191 Id. at 524-25.
192 Id. at 530.
193 Id.
194 Brief of Appellants at 32, Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518
(3d Cir. 2018) (No. 17-3113), 2017 WL 5515323, at *32.
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not sufficient. Clearly, their privacy claim against the school
district was not grounded in a "right to be let alone."
B. Limited Access
Another conception of privacy is that it is a "concern for
limited accessibility."1 95 Under this rubric, privacy exists to
limit access to the self. Ruth Gavison argues that we want
privacy to limit our "accessibility to others: the extent to which
we are known to others, the extent to which others have physi-
cal access to us, and the extent to which we are the subject of
others' attention."1 96 In this conception, a person would have
total privacy only if no one knew anything about her, no one
paid any attention to her, and no one had physical access to
her. Of course, as Gavison points out, such "perfect privacy"
could never exist in any society. 197 But if we start from that
(albeit imaginary) vantage point we can see that a person loses
privacy "as others obtain information about [that] individual,
pay attention to him, or gain access to him."19
8 Thus privacy
lessens as secrecy, anonymity, or solitude are diminished.
This conception of privacy also does not support a claim by
the cisgender woman who objects to sharing a bathroom with a
transgender woman (as opposed to other women). Carla
Cruzan sued her employer after a transgender woman col-
league was permitted to use the women's bathroom at her
workplace, claiming that this policy violated her privacy.
199
But the fact that Cruzan had to use a bathroom that was also
open to transgender women did not mean anyone would obtain
information about her or pay attention to her. Certainly,
Cruzan's use of the bathroom facility might communicate some
information to her coworkers. People who saw her walking into
the bathroom might assume that she needed to urinate, al-
though that assumption may or may not have been accu-
rate.20 0 They would also see that Cruzan identified as a woman
by her choice of bathroom, but they likely would have been
aware of her gender identity already, so it is questionable
whether that really qualifies as learning new information. But
the most important thing is that neither of these things that
people might learn about Cruzan based on her visit to the
195 Gavison, supra note 7, at 423.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 428.
198 ICL
199 Cruzanv. Minn. Pub. Sch. Sys., 165 F. Supp. 2d 964, 966 (D. Minn. 2001).
200 She could instead be planning to re-apply her makeup, defecate, or blow
her nose, among other reasons that people use bathroom facilities.
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bathroom was affected by whether a transgender woman was
also using that bathroom. The fact that a transgender woman
was also permitted to use the same shared women's bathroom
as Cruzan did not result in anyone knowing anything more
about Cruzan than they would had she used a women's bath-
room from which transgender women were excluded. She en-
joys the same level of secrecy about herself whether or not
transgender women are permitted to use the bathroom facility.
Nor does a transgender woman having access to the bath-
room facility mean that anyone will pay more attention to
Cruzan.20 1 People will not be more likely to notice Cruzan go-
ing to the bathroom facility just because a transgender woman
is also permitted to use it. The bathroom being accessible to
transgender women does not increase the attention paid to
Cruzan. She will not be looked at, scrutinized, or observed
more closely than were she only sharing the bathroom with
other cisgender women. Or, to put it another way, Cruzan's
level of anonymity in her workplace is simply not affected by
the decision to allow transgender women to utilize the women's
bathroom. Some people may notice her walking to the bath-
room, others may see her washing her hands in the sink, or
spot her leaving the facility after she is done using it. But this
is no more likely because transgender women also have access
to the same facility as Cruzan. Her level of scrutiny or anonym-
ity is the same.
Cruzan's level of solitude is also not affected by the deci-
sion to admit transgender women to the women's bathroom
facility.20 2 In a shared bathroom facility, Cruzan is always
subject to having to share the areas outside the bathroom
stalls with other people. While she will be alone in the bath-
room stall itself, the sinks, mirrors, and hand driers may be
used by other women while Cruzan is adjacent to them. Again,
this is true whether or not transgender women are among
those permitted to enter the women's bathroom facility.
Cruzan has the same amount of solitude that she had before.
With regard to all the three aspects of privacy identified by the
"limited access" conception, then, a cisgender objector's pri-
vacy is not diminished by transgender women being allowed to
use the bathroom facilities. On the other hand, a transgender
girl like Jane Doe does face a loss of privacy if she is forced to




use the boys' bathroom at her school.20 3 Being compelled to
use the male restroom will "out" Jane as transgender. When
she goes to the toilet marked "boys," that will communicate to
her fellow students that Jane was designated male at birth. It
will also likely provoke questions from the other children about
why Jane is going to the boys' bathroom and not the girls'
facility. A girl in the boys' restroom is likely to face stares and
hostility from boys who question whether she belongs in that
space. So Jane's classmates will both obtain information
about her and pay attention to her as a result of her exclusion
from the girls' bathroom. Under a limited access conception of
privacy, we can clearly see that barring Jane from the girls'
restroom will threaten her privacy.
C. Intimacy
Some scholars conceptualize the right to privacy as one
that safeguards intimacy. Tom Gerety argues that the right of
privacy exists to give adults "autonomy sufficient to bar state
intrusion, observation, or regulation of the harmless intimacies
of personal identity[,] . . . [which] begin with the body and its
sexuality."2 04 The paradigmatic example of this, Gerety says, is
the sexual relationship enjoyed by a married couple at issue in
Griswold v. Connecticut.20 5 In that case the Supreme Court
struck down a state statute that criminalized the use of contra-
ception by married couples.20 6 Justice William Douglas noted
that the law allowed the police "to search the sacred precincts
of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contracep-
tives[.]" 20 7 But as Gerety points out, there is no dispute that
police could enter the bedroom if they had a warrant to look for
illegal drugs, or evidence related to a murder.20 8 So the prob-
lem is not the physical location of the "sacred . . . marital
bedroom" but rather regulation of the intimate sexual relation-
ship between the couple.20 9 The state of Connecticut had em-
powered police officers to search people's bedrooms to
ascertain whether they were having sex forbidden by the stat-
ute. This was what Justice Douglas called "repulsive," because
intimate conduct at home should not be subject to such scru-
203 Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 208 F.
Supp. 3d 850, 874 (S.D. Ohio 2016).
204 Gerety, supra note 8, at 280.
205 Id. at 279; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965).
206 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
207 Id. at 485.
208 Id. at 486.
209 Id. at 485.
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tiny.2 10 In this view, the right of privacy protects the autonomy
of each person to engage in "bodily and mental intimacies over
which no one wishes to grant the state the right of
regulation."
2 1 1
Obviously, if a cisgender objector like Carla Cruzan is obli-
gated to use a shared women's bathroom facility that is also
used by a transgender woman, that does not implicate a sexual
relationship with another person.2 12 So the intimacy concep-
tion of privacy would initially not appear to give her any
grounds to object. But Gerety's conception of privacy does not
only cover sexual relationships, but also the intimacy of one's
own body. "Intimacy itself is always the consciousness of the
mind in its access to its own and other bodies and minds,
insofar, at least, as these are generally or specifically secluded
from the access of the uninvited."2 13 As such, the intimacy
conception of privacy also protects against intentional intru-
sions upon seclusion, either by physically violating a person's
solitude or by publicizing details of a person's intimate life.
These are, in Gerety's words, acts of "outrageous peering and
prying into private lives and things,"2 14 such as by watching a
mother give birth without her consent,2 15 or tricking a woman
into being photographed nude and distributing the images to
others.2
16
The seminal De May v. Roberts case was decided in 1891, a
few years before Warren and Brandeis published their ground-
breaking call for recognition of privacy rights.2 17 Roberts
brought suit after a man named Scattergood had entered her
home and watched the birth of her child.2 18 When Scattergood
arrived with her doctor, Roberts and her husband assumed
that he was a part of the medical team coming to help with the
birth. They therefore allowed him to enter their home. But
later they discovered that Scattergood had no medical training
or expertise at all. The court found that the Roberts had not
consented to Scattergood's presence because they were misled
as to his role, believing him to be a physician-in-training or
210 Id. at 486.
211 Gerety, supra note 8, at 272.
212 Cruzan v. Minn. Pub. Sch. Sys., 165 F. Supp. 2d 964, 966 (D. Minn. 2001).
213 Gerety, supra note 8, at 268.
214 I& at 263.
215 De Mayv. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146, 147 (1881).
216 York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 454 n.6 (9th Cir. 1963).
217 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 6.
218 De May, 9 N.W. at 148-49.
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other medical professional, when in fact he was not.2 19 As
such, his presence at the "sacred" occasion of the birth of their
child was an actionable violation of their privacy, and they were
entitled to damages.
220
In York v. Story, a police officer photographed Ms. York
naked after she reported a physical assault against her.22 1 The
officer ordered Ms. York into a room, locked her in, and then
told her to undress before photographing her in "indecent posi-
tions" despite her objections that the photographs would not
show her injuries.222 Officer Story later claimed he had de-
stroyed the images, but in fact he had shared them with other
officers, who also made additional copies. The Ninth Circuit
found that Ms. York had stated a claim for violation of her
Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy, declaring: "The desire
to shield one's unclothed figured from view of strangers, and
particularly strangers of the opposite sex, is impelled by ele-
mentary self-respect and personal dignity. ... We do not see
how it can be argued that the searching of one's home deprives
him of privacy, but the photographing of one's nude body, and
the distribution of such photographs to strangers does not."223
Privacy-as-intimacy protects against such acts of physical
invasion and publicity because it grants us "control over who, if
anyone, will share in the intimacies of our bodies."2 24 But can
a cisgender objector like Cruzan argue that allowing a trans-
gender woman to use the women's bathroom is a violation of
her bodily privacy akin to those suffered by Roberts and York?
A school district made such an argument in Board of Education
of the Highland Local School District v. United States Depart-
ment of Education.225 The district had refused to allow trans-
gender girl Jane Doe to use the girls' bathroom at her
elementary school. Examining the school district's justifica-
tions for its policy, the court noted that intervenors defending it
had pointed to "several Sixth Circuit cases concerning the right
to bodily privacy against invasive strip searches or videotap-
ing," but held that those were inapposite.22 6 After all, another
girl using the same bathroom facility as Jane Doe would not be
219 Id. at 149.
220 Id
221 York, 324 F.2d at 451.
222 Id. at 452.
223 Id. at 455.
224 Gerety, supra note 8, at 266.
225 Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 208 F.
Supp. 3d 850, 859 (S.D. Ohio 2016).
226 Id. at 875.
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photographed or videotaped. Nor would she have to expose her
naked body to a school official or anyone else; like most shared
bathrooms, the girl's facility at Jane's school had private stalls
that shielded their occupants from view while they used the
toilet. In contrast, Ms. York was forced to show her naked body
to an official who photographed it and distributed the
images.227 A cisgender objector like Cruzan cannot claim that
her body will be publicized, as in the York case.
But perhaps Roberts provides a more fitting analogy'?2 2 8 In
seeking to enter the girls' bathroom, is Jane Doe misrepresent-
ing herself just like Scattergood did in order to witness Roberts
giving birth? Like giving birth, courts generally regard urina-
tion and defecation as private acts. As one court put it, "there
are few activities that appear to be more at the heart of the
liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment than the right to eliminate harmful wastes from
one's body away from the observation of others."229 But again,
no girl using the Highland school facilities would be exposed
while using the toilet because private stalls were available. So,
neither Jane Doe nor anyone else would have witnessed the
intimate act at issue, as in the Roberts case. Scattergood mis-
led Roberts as to his purpose in being present; she thought he
was a medical professional present to assist in her labor and
delivery, when in fact he was not.2 30 Jane Doe, in contrast,
sought to enter the girl's bathroom for the appropriate reason:
she needs to use the toilet while attending school.2 3 ' As such,
227 Similarly, in Brannum v. Overton County School Board, 516 F.3d 489, 495
(6th Cir. 2008), school officials videotaped middle school students changing in
their locker rooms, recording the images and leaving them on an unsecure server,
from which they were downloaded several times. See also Doe v. Luzerne Cty.,
660 F.3d 169, 177 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that a deputy sheriff stated a claim for a
Fourteenth Amendment violation when a superior officer instructed her to un-
dress and shower while filming her); Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d
598, 604 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that defendants who strip searched high school
students at school violated their constitutional rights); Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d
1117, 1118-19 (4th Cir. 1981) (upholding verdict for a female prisoner who was
forcibly restrained by male guards while a female nurse removed her clothing).
228 De May v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146, 148-49 (1881).
229 West v. Dallas Police Dep't, No. Civ. A. 3-95CV-1347P, 1997 WL 452727, at
*6 (N.D. Tex. July 31, 1997); see also Glaspy v. Malicoat, 134 F. Supp. 2d 890,
895 (W.D. Mich. 2001) (holding that a prison visitor who was forced to urinate in
his pants because guards would not allow him to use the bathroom or leave the
facility had suffered a Fourteenth Amendment violation).
230 De May, 9 N.W. at 148.
231 The school district claimed that forbidding Jane from using the bathroom
was also necessary to guard against "lewdness" but there is no discussion in the
case of any evidence that Jane was behaving inappropriately. Bd. of Educ. of the
Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850, 874 (S.D.
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the intimacy conception of privacy does not seem to provide
any support for Carla Cruzan's claim that allowing a trans-
gender woman to use the women's facility she also used vio-
lated her right to privacy.
A transgender person like Jane Doe, on the other hand,
would seem to have a privacy interest in being able to use the
bathroom that accords with her gender identity that is cogniza-
ble under the intimacy conception of privacy. As noted above,
many transgender people report suffering physical and sexual
assault when using the bathroom.232 These incidents often
involve exposure or abuse of the victim's genitals. One trans-
gender man reported: "I went into the men's bathroom[.] . . . I
was just washing my hands when he first punched me in the
back and then went for my vagina. I nearly passed out due to
the blow."23 3 While a transgender woman who was recognized
as she left the woman's bathroom was surrounded by a group
of men who pushed her and "ripp[ed] [her] pants down."
234
According to a national survey of transgender people, such
incidents were more commonly suffered by respondents who
were identifiable as transgender based on how they look as
opposed to those who had greater passing privilege because
their physical appearance matched their gender identity.
23 5 If
a transgender girl like Jane Doe is forced to use the boy's
bathroom, her feminine appearance will out her as trans-
gender. That increased visibility of her transgender status will
put her at greater risk of assault and having her body exposed
or attacked, violating her right to privacy in the intimacy of her
body.
Laws and policies forcing people to use the bathroom that
matches their "biological gender" also expose transgender peo-
ple to questioning about the appearance of their genitals. In
Kastl v. Maricopa County Community College, a transgender
woman who sued after being fired for using the women's rest-
room at work was forced to answer questions concerning the
appearance of her genitals, and to disclose medical records
Ohio 2016). The "lewdness" concern was therefore likely a matter of stereotypes.
See infra Part IV.
232 JAMES ET AL., supra note 121, at 226-27.
233 Id. at 228.
234 Id.
235 See id. at 227. Forty-five percent of respondents who said that others
could always or usually tell they were transgender and 38% of those who said that
others could sometimes tell they were transgender eported one or more of these
experiences, in contrast to only 16% of those who said that others could rarely or
never tell that they were transgender.
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regarding the same.236 In determining that she had not suf-
fered illegal discrimination, the Court discussed Ms. Kastl's
genitals in detail, noting that she had testified that she had "a
penis and testicles" and that her doctor's notes from her last
physical stated that her "testicles were bilaterally descended
and there was no abnormality."237 While Ms. Kastl was not
forced to be photographed naked, she was compelled to answer
invasive questions about her genitals and discuss their appear-
ance.23 8 She also had to reveal medical documents concerning
the appearance of her genitals. Such compelled disclosures are
also extremely invasive and humiliating. Indeed, a transgender
woman might have a particular interest in keeping the appear-
ance of her genitals private, because they do not conform with
societal expectations of what a woman's body should look like.
A law or policy that conditions bathroom access on "biological
sex" or genitalia subjects transgender people to being ques-
tioned about the appearance of their genitals, which also in-
fringes on their right to intimate bodily privacy.
D. Control of Information
Another powerful conception of privacy is that it is the right
to control information about oneself. As Alan Westin explains,
"Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent infor-
mation about them is communicated to others."239 In this con-
ception, a person's privacy is violated when they have no
autonomy to decide who will have access to their personal in-
formation. Obviously, this is a pressing concern at a time when
technological advances create ever more sophisticated means
to obtain, gather, and share information about individuals.
This conception of privacy is concerned with safeguarding indi-
viduals' right to choose what information is shared about them
and when: "[p]rivacy [is] considered as the condition under
which there is control over acquaintance with one's personal
affairs by the one enjoying it."240 To demonstrate that her pri-
vacy had been violated under this conception, a cisgender ob-
236 Kastl v. Maricopa Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. CV-02-1531-PHX-SRB, 2006
WL 2460636, at *1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 22, 2006).
237 Id. at *5-6.
238 As Tobias Wolff points out, "antagonists treat the physical reality of the
transgender person-his or her genital configuration or other physical character-
istics-as requiring obsessive attention." Wolff, supra note 68, at 211.
239 WESTIN, supra note 9, at 7.
240 Hyman Gross, Privacy and Autonomy, in XIII NOMOS 169 (J. Roland Pen-
nock& John W. Chapman eds., 1971).
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jector like Carla Cruzan would have to show that permitting a
transgender woman access to the shared bathroom she used
would cause her to lose control over her personal informa-
tion.2 4 1 But that is simply not the case. If a transgender
woman is allowed to use the same shared facility as Cruzan,
she might be able to see Cruzan applying makeup or washing
her hands at the sink, but these activities were already subject
to observation by other women in the facility. So Cruzan's
control over her personal information is not reduced.
The animating concern behind many efforts to exclude
transgender women from the women's bathroom appears to be
that transgender women will use the bathroom to "peep" at or
even assault other women. Of course, such violations are ille-
gal whether committed by a transgender or cisgender per-
son.2 4 2 There is also no evidence that protecting LGBT people
from discrimination in public accommodations leads to sexual
misconduct in bathrooms. Eighteen states, the District of Co-
lumbia, and more than 200 municipalities have laws permit-
ting transgender people to use facilities that accord with their
gender identity.24 3 These protections have not led to voyeurism
or physical attacks in bathrooms. Rather, "prosecutors, law
enforcement agencies[,] and state human rights commissions
have consistently denied that there is any correlation between
such policies and a spike in assaults."24 4 Given the lack of
evidence that transgender women permitted to use women's
bathrooms will violate the law by engaging in voyeurism, there
is no basis to believe that Cruzan will lose control of personal
information about the appearance of her naked body or any-
241 Cruzan v. Minn. Pub. Sch. Sys., 165 F. Supp. 2d 964, 966 (D. Minn. 2001).
242 E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1801 (2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.21 (West 2017) ("A
person who knowingly views .... another person, for the purpose of arousing or
gratifying the sexual desire of any person, commits invasion of privacy [an aggra-
vated misdemeanor,] if . . . [t]he other person does not ... consent to being
viewed, ... [tlhe other person is in a state of full or partial nudity... [and tlhe
other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy."); Bill Chappell, 'Playboy'
Model Sentenced Over Body Shaming Woman at Gym, NPR (May 25, 2017), http:/
/www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/05/25/529999618/playboy-model-
sentenced-over-body-shaming-woman-at-gym [https: //perma.cc/43J3-BRM3].
Sadly, people do commit crimes in bathrooms and locker rooms. A recent high-
profile example is that of Dani Mathers, a cisgender Playboy model who took a
picture of a 70-year-old woman naked in a women's locker room at an LA Fitness
gym and posted it on social media. Mathers was convicted of invasion of privacy
and sentenced to community service. Id.
243 Transgender Bathroom Access Laws in the United States, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Transgender-bathroomaccess-laws in-theUnited_
States#citenote-aclu-1 [https://perma.cc/3ENH-DTTMI (last visited Jan. 11,
2019).
244 Grinberg & Stewart, supra note 64.
[Vol. 104:17191758
PRIVACY AS PRETEXT
thing else.2 45 Cruzan simply does not have less privacy under
this conception if her transgender coworker has access to the
women's bathroom. Her control over her personal information
remains the same.
In contrast, when a transgender girl like Jane Doe is de-
nied access to the bathroom that accords with her gender iden-
tity and forced to use the boy's bathroom instead, she does lose
control over her personal information.246 Both the fact that
Jane was assigned male at birth and that she is transgender
are revealed when she is forced to use the boy's bathroom. She
no longer gets to decide whether to share these personal facts
about herself with other children or teachers at her school.
Instead, her assigned sex and transgender status are revealed
without her consent.
E. Personhood
One influential theory of privacy views it as protecting per-
sonhood. The term "personhood" originated with Paul
Freund,24 7 who used it to refer to "those attributes of an indi-
vidual which are irreducible in his selfhood. " 248 In Warren and
Brandeis' seminal article, they wrote that the right to privacy
was based on the principle that each person had a right to his
"inviolate personality."249 Brandeis expounded on the idea
forty years later as a Supreme Court Justice, writing in dissent
in Olmstead v. United States, a case that found no legal viola-
tion after the government wiretapped a person's phone.2 50
Brandeis argued that:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure condi-
tions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized
the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings[,]
and of his intellect.... They sought to protect Americans in
their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions[,] and their sen-
sations. They conferred, as against the Government, the
right to be let alone.251
245 Cruzan v. Minn. Pub. Sch. Sys., 165 F. Supp. 2d 964, 966 (D. Minn. 2001).
246 Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 208 F.
Supp. 3d 850, 859 (S.D. Ohio 2016).
247 Craven, supra note 10, at 702.
248 Professor Paul A. Freund, Address at the Annual Dinner of the American
Law Institute (May 23, 1975), 52 A.L.I. PRoc. 563, at 574 (1975).
249 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 6, at 205.





Privacy as personhood protects people's right to make au-
tonomous decisions about how they want to live their lives,
without interference from the government or other people. It
conceives privacy as the freedom to choose what kind of person
one wants to be and to live in accordance with that vision
without undue meddling. As Ed Bloustein writes, "[a]n intru-
sion on our privacy threatens our liberty as individuals to do as
we will." 2 5 2 Thus privacy protects against acts that are
"demeaning to individuality," "an affront to personal dignity,"
or an "assault on human personality."2 53 The Supreme Court
embraced a personhood theory of privacy in its decisions on the
right to privacy such as Griswold v. Connecticut, Eisenstadt v.
Baird, and Roe v. Wade, which involved decisions about repro-
duction, family formation, marriage, and raising children.
254
The Court explained that such matters were protected by a
constitutional right to privacy because they
involv[e] the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, [and] are central to the liberty protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the
right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of
the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about
these matters could not define the attributes of personhood
were they formed under compulsion of the State.
25 5
So does a cisgender objector like Carla Cruzan have a claim
under this conception of privacy? Is her ability to define for
herself what kind of person she will be undercut by a trans-
gender woman being allowed to use the same shared bathroom
facility that she frequents? Certainly, people have very strong
feelings about the issue of who is allowed to use the same
bathroom as them. A cisgender objector might say that permit-
ting transgender women to use the women's bathroom dam-
ages her personal identity because she defines herself as a
traditionalist who rejects a "radical homosexual agenda" and
believes in a God-given distinction between men and women.
Thus, living in a community with transgender women is pro-
foundly at odds with her religious beliefs, or sense of morality.
It impinges on her autonomy to define her identity according to
her traditional, transphobic values.
252 Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 1002 (1964).
253 Id. at 973-74.
254 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
440 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965).
255 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
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Jed Rubenfeld criticized the personhood conception of pri-
vacy for just this reason, pointing out that some people may
defne their personhood through intolerance.256 Such individ-
uals deeply value living in a community that excludes others of
whom they disapprove. He noted that recognizing the right of
LGBT people to engage in same-sex relationships without being
criminalized might be said to undermine the rights of an "intol-
erant heterosexual" who "can claim, on personhood's own
logic, that critical to his identity is not only his heterosexuality
but also his decision to live in a homogenously heterosexual
community."257
Of course, laws or policies excluding transgender people
from bathrooms are arguably different from sodomy laws,
which effectively rendered being gay a criminal offense.25 8
School officials who refuse to allow a transgender girl to use the
bathroom that accords with her gender identity do not claim
that doing so will stop her from being transgender;25 9 they
accept that she may continue to be a transgender girl but nev-
ertheless insist that she use the boys' bathroom or, in some
cases, an individual gender-neutral bathroom. Such laws or
policies arguably do not remove transgender people from the
community260 and produce the homogeneously cisgender com-
munity the intolerant objector is seeking. Even if the school
does exclude transgender girls from the bathroom, the cis-
gender objector will still attend school or work with trans-
gender women. The only difference will be that now she does
not have to spend the small percentage of her day that she is in
the bathroom in the immediate vicinity of transgender women.
Viewed in that way, it is clear that the impact of bathroom
256 Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 768 (1989).
257 Id. at 765.
258 See Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by "Un-
enforced" Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.RI-C.L. L. REV. 103 (2000) (discussing how
"the very existence of sodomy laws creates a criminal class of gay men and lesbi-
ans, who are consequently targeted for violence, harassment, and discrimination
because of their criminal status").
259 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of
Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850, 856 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (describing how school officials
refused to allow Jane Doe, a transgender girl, to use the girls' restroom but
nevertheless agreed to "address [her] as a female").
260 Many would argue, however, that these laws are, at bottom, an effort to
eradicate transgender people. Transgender advocates frequently characterize ef-
forts to protect bathroom access as a fight to ensure transgender people have the
right to exist in public spaces. E.g., Shayna Medley, Trans and Non-Binary People





inclusion (or exclusion) on the objector's personhood rights-
her ability to "define herself'-is negligible, even if she con-
structs her whole identity around opposition to transgender
women.
Indeed, the reality is that the group of people using any
given women's bathroom are likely to be diverse in a number of
ways-in terms of age, race, weight, height, reproductive ca-
pacity, etc. So why would the characteristic in question-that
of being assigned male at birth as opposed to assigned female-
loom so large as to impact the very identity of another woman
using that bathroom at the same time? If the cisgender objec-
tor is compelled to use a women's bathroom that is also acces-
sible to transgender woman, that would not seem to undermine
her conception of who she is as a woman any more than a tall
woman using the facility would make a petite person tall. Her
identity formulation remains intact.
26 1
Again we can contrast that with the impact upon a trans-
gender girl like Jane Doe who is excluded from the girl's bath-
room at school.2 62 Jane identifies as a girl. But when she is
excluded from the girls' bathroom and forced to use the one for
boys, Jane is categorized as a boy by the school and even forced
to identify herself as a boy by walking into the boys' restroom.
Even if the school allows her to express her female gender
identity in other ways, for example by wearing female clothing
or using a girl's name, by categorizing her as a boy they reduce
her to a boy in a dress rather than the girl that she is. This
concern applies with equal force to people who have a nonbi-
nary gender identity and do not identify exclusively as either
male or female. Requiring a nonbinary person to use either a
men's or women's restroom fails to respect their identity.
263
Gender is one of the most visible and socially significant cate-
gories we have for organizing people in our society.
264 So forc-
261 But see JANICE G. RAYMOND, THE TRANSSEXUAL EMPIRE: THE MAKING OF THE
SHE-MALE 104 (1979) (arguing that the existence of transgender women is an
assault on the identity of cisgender women: "[all transsexuals rape women's
bodies by reducing the real female form to an artifact, appropriating this body for
themselves").
262 Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist., 208 F. Supp. 3d at 857.
263 As Jessica Clarke points out, the ideal solution for accommodating people
of all gender identities is to phase out gendered spaces altogether, providing
instead "larger, open, public spaces and fully enclosed private stalls that would
better ensure safety, accommodate families, and operate fairly and efficiently."
Clarke, supra note 127 at 982; see also Laura Portuondo, The Overdue Case
Against Sex-Segregated Bathrooms, 29 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 465, 496 (2018).




ing a person to adopt a gender identity that is not their own is a
significant burden upon their personal identity.2 65 This is why
gender dysphoria can produce clinically significant distress,
including suicidal ideation, from which Jane herself suf-
fered.26 6 So again, under a personhood conception of privacy,
we can clearly see that Jane's privacy is threatened by exclud-
ing her from the bathroom, while the cisgender objector does
not actually lose privacy if Jane is admitted.
This is all the more clear when we examine the refinement
on the personhood conception of privacy advanced by Jed
Rubenfeld. Rubenfeld argued that the constitutional right to
privacy exists to protect against "a particular kind of creeping
totalitarianism, an unarmed occupation of individuals'
lives."267 In this conception, the government violates privacy
when it directs a person's life course, forcing her to conform to
a standardized conception of normal behavior. Privacy is thus
to be invoked "only where the government threatens to take
over or occupy our lives-to exert its power in some way over
the totality of our lives."2 68 The Supreme Court's privacy deci-
sions can therefore be understood as protecting individuals
from being forced into socially enforced behaviors that take
over their lives, such as by being compelled to bear a child,
attend public school, or marry someone of the same race.2 6 9
Such activities enlist, direct, and take over people's lives, and
so people have a constitutional privacy right to refuse to par-
ticipate in them.
A cisgender student who objected to sharing the girl's bath-
room with Jane Doe, however, could not claim that having to
do so would direct her life course or take over her identity.2 70
Unlike being forced to bear a child, being compelled to use a
265 See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist, 897 F.3d 518, 523 (3d Cir.
2018) ("Forcing transgender students to use bathrooms or locker rooms that do
not match their gender identity is particularly harmful. It causes 'severe psycho-
logical distress often leading to attempted suicide.'" (citations omitted)).
266 Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 208 F.
Supp. 3d 850, 856 (S.D. Ohio 2016). In order to qualify for a diagnosis of Gender
Dysphoria under the DSM-V, a patient must be suffering from "clinically signifi-
cant distress." Transgender people are at much higher risk of suicidal idea-
tion and completed suicide than cisgender persons. See William Byne et al.,
Gender Dysphoria in Adults: An Overview and Primer for Psychiatrists, 3 TRANS-
GENDER HEALTH 57, 63 (2018) https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5
944396/ [https://perma.cc/CQ35-AMR5] (noting that "[ulp to 47% of trans-
gender adults have considered or attempted suicide").
267 Rubenfeld, supra note 256, at 784.
268 Id. at 787.
269 Id. at 793.
270 Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist., 208 F. Supp. 3d at 856.
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bathroom that is also open to transgender women only affects
the small percentage of the objector's day that she spends in
the restroom. It does not fill up her life. As such, it does not
violate her right to privacy from creeping totalitarianism.
The situation is different for Jane Doe, however. A require-
ment that she use the boy's bathroom imposes a far greater
burden on her freedom to direct her own life course. Since
Jane identifies as a girl, when she is compelled to use the boy's
restroom she is forced to deny her true identity. "[Walking into
a toilet segregated by sex requires that each of us in effect self-
segregate by hanging a gendered sign on ourselves[.]"
2 7 1 Jane
is thus required to state that she is a boy, rather than a girl,
and forced to reveal that she is transgender, rather than keep-
ing her transgender status hidden. Such actions reverberate
throughout Jane's life, affecting far more than just the few
minutes she spends in the bathroom each day. Not only is the
very act of denying her identity likely to cause Jane humilia-
tion, shame, and distress, being exposed as transgender to her
community will expose her to verbal harassment and physical
abuse as well. Both will have a profound impact on her physi-
cal and mental health. When the real eleven-year-old Jane Doe
was not permitted to use the girl's bathroom at her elementary
school, the stress of being excluded and the bullying she en-
dured from teachers and children who disapproved of her
transgender status caused her to attempt suicide.
2 72 She had
to be hospitalized on two separate occasions for suicidal idea-
tion and a suicide attempt.
2 73 A government action that limits
a person's autonomy so profoundly that she tries to kill herself
to escape its strictures clearly has taken over her life. Under
Rubenfeld's refinement of the personhood theory, we again see
that laws forcing transgender people to use bathrooms that
conflict with their gender identity violate their right to privacy
but are not necessary to defend the privacy of cisgender
objectors.
F. Social Network Privacy
In Doe v. Boyertown Area School District, four cisgender
students sued to overturn a school policy permitting trans-
gender high school students to use bathrooms and locker
271 Mary Anne Case, Why Not Abolish Laws of Urinary Segregation?, in TOILET:
PUBLIC RESTROOMS AND THE POLITICS OF SHARING, supra note 25, at 218.
272 Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist., 208 F. Supp. 3d at 856.
273 Id.
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rooms in accordance with their gender identity.274 The plain-
tiffs claimed that the school district's practice violated their
right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment, their right
of access to educational programs under Title IX, and their
Pennsylvania common law right of privacy preventing inclusion
upon their seclusion while using bathrooms and locker
rooms.2 75 They sought a preliminary injunction requiring the
school district to ensure students used facilities corresponding
to their "biological sex."
2 76
In addition to claiming that the policy violated their privacy
because it meant a transgender student might see them par-
tially undressed, the plaintiffs also claimed that it undermined
their privacy because a transgender girl might hear a cisgender
girl "opening products to deal with menstruation issues or us-
ing the restrooms" and thus the transgender girl could discern
that the cisgender girl was menstruating.2 77 One plaintiff in
the case, Mary Smith, claimed that the stalls in the multi-user
bathrooms did not provide her with privacy because people
could hear her opening pads or tampons while she was in-
side.2 78 Similarly, Plaintiff Macy Roe stated that bathroom
stalls were insufficiently private because she could "still be
heard going to the bathroom or attending [her] period, and
there are large gaps in the stalls that [she has] made eye con-
tact through before."27 9 The court noted, however, that Macy
Roe testified she had never seen anyone purposefully looking
through the gaps in the bathroom stall.2 80 The court also
quoted a medical doctor who testified as an expert on the treat-
ment of transgender youth and indicated that transgender
youth with gender dysphoria are "far more likely to want to
conceal their physical anatomy and are typically extremely
hypervigilant within sex-segregated" facilities.28 1 He further
testified that "transgender patients are ... particularly modest
about exposing themselves while using privacy facilities."28 2
The district court held that the fundamental right to privacy
did not extend to protection from "being heard . . . in an area
such as a locker room or multi-user bathroom where there is a
274 276 F. Supp. 3d. 324, 329-30 (E.D. Pa. 2017).
275 Id at 330.
276 Id
277 Id. at 383.
278 Id. at 360.
279 Id. at 362-63.
280 Id at 363.




limited amount of auditory privacy from anyone."
283 While the
plaintiffs claimed that the presence of a "member of the oppo-
site sex" in a bathroom or locker room was objectively offensive
because people "require a buffer from members of the opposite
sex that we do not require from members of the same sex,"
2 8 4
the court rejected that contention, noting that multi-user bath-
rooms and locker rooms are "shared common areas with other
students,"2 85 and so the plaintiffs could not claim that they
attempted to seclude themselves by entering them.
But arguably, the plaintiffs in Doe v. Boyertown Area
School District were making an associational privacy claim
about the social network of girls in the bathroom. Mary Smith
and Marcy Doe asserted that when students who they called
"members of the same sex" heard them urinate or open tampon
wrappers, the information gleaned from that auditory exposure
was still private.28 6 But when a transgender student heard the
same thing, it was an unauthorized disclosure that violated
their privacy.287 Similarly, the practice of "outing" LGBT celeb-
rities, or revealing a famous person's sexual orientation with-
out their consent, was frequently criticized as an invasion of
privacy.288 This objection arose even when the information
was widely known within the LGBT community. Publicizing
the facts to the wider heterosexual world infringed on the celeb-
rity's privacy because it violated a "long standing agreement
among gay people that they kept each others' secrets.
'" 28 9
We might also analogize the Doe plaintiffs' claim to that of a
member of Alcoholics Anonymous who wants to be able to tell
fellow A.A. members that she is an alcoholic but does not want
that information shared with others. Some privacy scholars
find the A.A. member's claim compelling. Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz argues, for example, that groups like A.A. "can be
designed to trigger reciprocal nondisclosure, and people mak-
ing germane disclosures within these settings generally ought
to expect that the information disclosed will not circulate
283 Id. at 388.
284 Id. at 406.
285 Id. at 407.
286 Id. at 406.
287 Id.
288 See generally Katheleen Guzman, About Outing: Public Discourse, Private
Lives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1531 (1995) (noting that while proponents claimed outing
was necessary to counter homophobic stereotypes with real-life examples of suc-
cessful LGBT people, it was an ineffective advocacy tool and potentially subjected
people to anti-gay discrimination and violence).




outside the group."290 In his view, a famous actress who dis-
closes that she is an alcoholic at an A.A. meeting "ought to have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the disclosed
information."291
As a matter of law, "AA and other self-help groups do not
enjoy the veil of legal confidentiality-evidentiary privilege."2 92
Courts have repeatedly rejected claims that confessions to fel-
low A.A. members are protected by privileges afforded to com-
munications with a psychotherapist or a spiritual advisor. In
State v. Boobar, for example, Ronald Boobar appealed his mur-
der conviction on the basis that two members of A.A. who testi-
fied regarding statements Boobar had made to them should
have been barred from doing so on the basis of privilege.293
But the court held it was "not reasonable to conclude. . . that
by the language of [the Maine counseling and therapist stat-
ute], the legislature intended to sweep information disclosed to
peer counselor or self-help groups like AA within the privilege
set forth."2
94
While information shared in A.A. or other self-help groups
may not be legally privileged, however, participants might still
be justified in thinking that it will not be disseminated beyond
the group. "When an individual speaks with relative strangers
in a support group like Alcoholics Anonymous, she trusts that
they will not divulge her secrets."295 The norms of the social
network and the identities of the group's members give her
reassurance that they will keep information shared there confi-
dential. Ethnographer Gene Shelley found that people with
HIV frequently kept their HIV status secret from friends and
family because they were afraid of being ostracized.2 96 But
those same people felt comfortable telling other members of a
support group for people with HIV about their status, even if
290 Strahilevitz, supra note 11, at 970.
291 Id.
292 Bree Schonbrun, "In the Light of Reason and Experience": The Scope of
Evidentiary Privilege in the Self-Help Setting: Alcoholics Anonymous Examined, 25
CARDOZO L. REv. 1203, 1206 (2004).
293 637 A.2d 1162, 1169 (Me. 1994).
294 Id.; see also Cox v. Miller, 296 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that defen-
dant's communications to members of an A.A. group are not privileged under New
York state law); United States v. Schwensow, 942 F. Supp. 402, 403-04 (E.D. Wis.
1996) (holding that confessions to A.A. counselors are not privileged under the
psychotherapist privilege).
295 Ar Ezra Waldman, Thst: A Model for Disclosure in Patent Law, 92 IND. L. J.
557, 583 (2017).
296 Gene A. Shelley, H. Russell Bernard, Peter Killworth, Eugene Johnsen &
Christopher McCarty, Who Knows Your HIV Status? What HIV+ Patients and Their
Network Members Know About Each Other, 17 Soc. NETWORKS 189, 204 (1995).
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they hardly knew them.297 They trusted fellow HIV positive
individuals to keep the information private: "with respect to
preventing the further spread of [information about] a person's
HIV status, individuals living with HIV can better predict the
future behavior of others also living with HIV (even if they know
very little else about them) than others with whom they may be
close for different reasons."29 8 Certainly, for people battling
addictions or coping with health conditions like HIV, support
groups provide an important outlet where people who may be
isolated or marginalized can find community and understand-
ing. The fact that such groups have a powerful norm barring
the disclosure of information about members outside the group
setting means they provide a safe space where individuals can
share potentially stigmatizing information without fear of it be-
ing further disseminated.
299
Obviously, multi-user bathrooms do not have the same
shared norm of nondisclosure as an A.A. meeting. No one
makes announcements in the bathroom that "what is said in
the room remains in the room," as they do at the beginning of
A.A. meetings.300 But Macy Roe and Mary Smith's argument
hinges on what they perceive as the shared characteristics of
girls using the bathroom. Like the HIV positive people in the
Shelley study, they view the girls in the bathroom as fellow
travelers-people with a common trait who will keep informa-
tion related to that stigmatized characteristic private. So, from
Doe and Smith's point of view, it doesn't matter if other girls
know they have their period because they would not tell anyone
else that information. Since the other girls also experience
stigma regarding menstruation, they have the same incentive
Doe and Smith do to keep it a secret.
301
On the other hand, Doe and Smith claim a transgender girl
is a "biological male."3 0 2 As such, they view her as no more
likely to keep information about their periods secret than any
other boy. But a transgender girl does not identify as a boy-
she lives and sees herself as a girl. While she might not experi-
297 Id.
298 Waldman, supra note 295, at 584.
299 Strahilevitz, supra note 11, at 969-70.
300 See Jessica G. Weiner, "And the Wisdom to Know the Difference": Confiden-
tiality vs. Privilege in the Self-Help Setting, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 243, 307 n. 118
(1995).
301 Cf. SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 339 (1998) (describing a girl's
embarrassment as male relatives make jokes about her menstruation).




ence menstruation, she is certainly not exempt from miso-
gynistic harassment; indeed, she is probably more likely to
experience sexist bullying than a cisgender girl. 30 3 As such,
she has the same incentive to avoid publicizing what goes on in
the girls' bathroom as Macy Doe does. She is not a boy who
might be expected to harass Doe by gossiping or teasing her
about the fact that she has her period. Such behavior would
only open her up to uncomfortable questions about her own
anatomy.
Similarly, self-help groups like A.A. and other similar
twelve-step programs are open to anyone who self-identifies as
needing the intervention offered. There is no requirement that
would-be A.A. members produce medical documentation or
other evidence to prove that they are alcoholics, or that they
have experienced particular difficulties related to their addic-
tion. Rather, any person who believes they are dependent on
alcohol and wants help to overcome that dependence can par-
ticipate.30 4 As such, an A.A. member who decides to share
information about, for example, losing a job due to being drunk
at work runs the risk that someone else in the group may not
have had that exact same experience. But still he trusts that
the other A.A. member will keep his confidence because their
stories are sufficiently analogous to generate sympathy and
understanding. Similarly, a girl in the bathroom at school
might hope that other girls present will safeguard information
about her period, even if they themselves do not menstruate.
So the desire for social network privacy does not justify
excluding transgender people from the bathroom most aligned
with their gender identity.30 5 A transgender girl is just as likely
to form a reliable member of the social network in the women's
bathroom as any other woman.
A careful examination of the asserted privacy interest in
excluding transgender women from the women's bathroom
303 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of
Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850, 856 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (describing how Jane Doe, a
transgender girl, was bullied to the point that she became suicidal).
304 "AA has, since its formal inception in 1938, represented itself as a nonde-
nominational 'fellowship of men and women' whose only requirement for member-
ship is the desire to stop drinking." Schonbrun, supra note 292, at 1225.
305 Respecting the gender identity of nonbinary people who do not identify
exclusively as male or female requires offering gender neutral facilities that do not
require people to select a male or female facility. Until such facilities can be made
available, a "temporary solution is to permit nonbinary people to use whichever
facility they feel the safest in, or which they believe best matches their sex or
gender, just as transgender men and women should be able to." Clarke, supra
note 127, at 983.
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shows that it does not accord with any of the philosophical
conceptions of privacy that undergird the legal right to privacy
protection. While all people have a legitimate interest in pri-
vacy when they use the bathroom, allowing transgender people
to use the facility that accords with their gender identity does
not undermine bathroom privacy for cisgender people. Rather,
it is policies that make transgender people use facilities accord-
ing to their assigned sex at birth rather than their gender iden-
tity that raise genuine privacy concerns. The privacy interests
asserted to oppose antidiscrimination protections for LGBT
people are clearly nothing more than a pretext used to justify
continuing discrimination against sexual minorities. Efforts to
enact so-called "privacy protection acts" that repeal antidis-
crimination laws and exclude transgender women from wo-
men's bathrooms therefore do not enhance the privacy rights of
women and children. They impose direct harms upon trans-
gender women, who are excluded from facilities that reflect
their gender identity and subjected to grave privacy violations,
described above. But such efforts also harm cisgender women
because they reify damaging stereotypes that undermine wo-
men's equality and safety. Part IV discusses the negative ef-
fects that efforts to justify transgender bathroom exclusion on
privacy grounds have on all women.
IV
WHY THE PRiVACY PRETEXT FOR DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
LGBT PEOPLE HARMS ALL WOMEN
The argument that permitting transgender women to use
the women's bathroom violates the privacy of other women and
girls is grounded in pernicious gendered stereotypes that un-
dermine sex equality. As such, the privacy pretext for discrimi-
nation against LGBT people is a threat to all women. As noted
above, opponents of LGBT equality frequently argue that anti-
discrimination protections for LGBT people will lead to wo-
men's privacy being violated by permitting (predatory) trans-
gender women to use women's bathrooms.30 6 The specter of
sexual predation looms large, but while many communities
have had laws forbidding discrimination based on sexual orien-
tation or gender identity on the books for years, there have not
306 E.g., Robin Charlow, Tolerating Deception and Discrimination After Batson,
50 STAN. L. REV. 9, 37 (1997) (discussing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).
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been reports of sexual assaults in bathrooms as a result.3 0 7 So
why do opponents continue to invoke concerns about sexual
predation in arguing that antidiscrimination protections must
be rolled back to protect women's privacy? The reason is that
they are appealing to, and re-inscribing, powerful gender ste-
reotypes. Traditional conceptions of sex and gender hold that
all people can be cleanly categorized into two sexes-male and
female. People who are designated male at birth are expected
to have a male gender identity, to be masculine in presentation,
and to sexually desire (and dominate) women. While people
designated female at birth should identify as women, be femi-
nine in presentation, and sexually submit to men. Traditional
understandings of sexuality do not just mandate heterosexual-
ity for everyone. They also prescribe relationship roles for men
and women. A man is expected to be sexually aggressive and
demanding, while a woman should be virginal and pure, reluc-
tant to engage in sex except as part of a committed relationship
to a special man she wants to please. As Erving Goffman put it,
"men are defined as desiring access to women and women as
holding them in check."30 8
LGBT people by nature do not conform to these expecta-
tions. Their identities thus threaten patriarchal heteronorma-
tive understandings of human sexuality. Lesbian, gay, and
bisexual people undermine compulsory heterosexuality, while
transgender and gender variant people problematize the notion
that a particular gender identity and presentation automati-
cally flows from the sex one is assigned at birth. Efforts to
eliminate antidiscrimination protections for LGBT people can
therefore be viewed as an attempt to shore up traditional sex
roles by granting a right to exclude people who do not conform
to them.
More specifically, patriarchal heteronormative ideas about
sexuality are the reason why the presence of transgender wo-
men in women's bathrooms is so threatening to traditionalists.
They believe that a person designated male at birth should be a
man, and that men have a natural urge to sexually dominate or
even assault women. That is why permitting a transgender
woman to use a women's bathroom is a threat to "sexual mod-
307 E.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Nonsense About Bathrooms: How Pur-
ported Concerns Over Safety Block LGBT Nondiscrimination Laws and Obscure
Real Religious Liberty Concerns, 20 LEwIS & CLARK L. REv. 1373, 1386 (2017).
308 Erving Goffman, The Arrangement Between the Sexes, 4 THEORY & SOC'Y
301, 330 n.8 (1977).
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esty" for cisgender objectors like Carla Cruzan.30 9 A person
who espouses traditional sex roles believes a person designated
male at birth must be a man, and that a man must naturally
want to behave in a sexually aggressive way towards women.
So allowing a person assigned male at birth to use a women's
bathroom is inviting a sexually predatory individual into the
space, even if that person is an eleven-year-old schoolgirl like
Jane Doe.
The flip side to the troubling stereotype that all men are
potential rapists is the even more pernicious idea that women
are seductive objects who lure men into sexual violence. Tradi-
tional understandings of gender also suggest that women are
responsible for preventing sexual assault by hiding themselves
from men. If women do not dress or behave in a sufficiently
modest way, they will deservedly be sexually assaulted because
men have irresistible urges to rape them.
This thinking was on display in Dothard v. Rawlinson,
where the Supreme Court upheld a ban on women working as
corrections officers in Alabama maximum security prisons.
3 10
The state argued that the ban was necessary because women
simply could not effectively control prisoners, and their pres-
ence would provoke violence.3 1 ' The Court agreed, finding it
plausible that "sex offenders who have criminally assaulted
women in the past would be moved to do so again if access to
women were established within the prison."3 12 In dissent, Jus-
tice Marshall called this "one of the most insidious of the old
myths about women[;] that women, wittingly or not, are seduc-
tive sexual objects. The effect of the decision, made I am sure
with the best of intentions, is to punish women because their
very presence might provoke sexual assaults."
3 13
The notion that men have uncontrollable urges to rape
which women are responsible for controlling is extremely dam-
aging to women's autonomy and safety. It also harms men by
stereotyping them as predators, a burden that falls heaviest on
African American men who are commonly perceived to be "less
able to control their desire or sexual urges than white men"
3 14
and thus suffer the "stigmatic harm of repeatedly being raced
309 Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 14, Cruzan v. Minneapolis Pub. Sch. Sys., 165
F. Supp. 2d 964 (D. Minn. 2001) (No. 01-3417), 2001 WL 34091359, at *6.
310 Dothard v. Rawllnson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977).
311 Ic at 343.
312 Id at 335.
313 IL at 345 (Marshall, J., dissenting).




and sexed as a rapist."3 15 This trope further suggests that
women who suffer sexual assaults are somehow to blame for
their victimization. Over the past few decades, legal reformers
have worked diligently to change this perception and ensure
that rape victims can access justice without being castigated
for "bringing it on themselves."3 16 Most recently, the #MeToo
movement has drawn attention to the sexual violence that wo-
men (and some men) have suffered in a variety of settings,
including at work, to suggest that victims deserve to be heard
and believed, and to hold abusers accountable and obtain
justice.3
17
Excluding transgender women from women's facilities does
not address any actual threat to women's privacy or safety. As
the outpouring of accounts of sexual violence in connection
with the #MeToo movement suggests, the greatest hreat to
women's sexual autonomy and safety does not come from
transgender women in bathrooms but men (and some women)
who prey upon people at work, in the community, and at
home.3 18 Not only do efforts to roll back antidiscrimination
protection for LGBT people and exclude transgender women
from women's facilities do nothing to address these actual
threats of sexual violence, they shore up pernicious stereotypes
that make all women more vulnerable to sexual assault. By
suggesting that all women are seductive sexual objects who
must hide themselves from men to escape sexual violence, the
discourse about transgender bathroom access reifies the dam-
aging myth that women are to blame when men rape them.
This insidious idea hurts all women, including cisgender wo-
men, undermining their right to be free from sexual violence.
Efforts to legalize discrimination against LGBT people and
ban transgender women from women's bathrooms do not pro-
tect women's privacy or safety. They are instead a calculated
315 Id. at 1391.
316 See Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License:
Sexual Consent and A New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 51, 54 (2002)
(noting that the law traditionally would regard nonconsensual sex as rape only if
the victim was a chaste woman, and that prior to the enactment of rape shield
laws, defendants were free "to suggest that the complainant was routinely un-
chaste and 'asking for it' on the night in question").
317 Jessica L. Crutcher, #Metoo: The Survivors, HOUS. LAW. (March/April 2018),
at 44 (describing how the #MeToo social media movement has given survivors of
sexual assault a platform to at last be heard: "I, too,' they say, was raped, sexually
assaulted, stalked, sexually harassed, groped by strangers on the street, made to





effort to deploy fear in the service of rolling back LGBT equality.
But in addition to doing nothing to enhance women's privacy,
such efforts actually harm all women because they also reify
damaging myths that justify and excuse sexual violence.
CONCLUSION
Laws and policies that repeal antidiscrimination protection
for LGBT people and compel everyone to use only the bathroom
that accords with their "biological sex" are frequently justified
on the basis that they are necessary to protect women's pri-
vacy. But a closer examination of the privacy interests at stake
show that allowing transgender people to use the bathroom
that matches their gender identity does not diminish the pri-
vacy of cisgender women. As such, efforts to roll back antidis-
crimination protection for LGBT people and exclude
transgender women from women's facilities do not enhance
women's privacy. Instead, they not only impose grave privacy
violations on transgender people, they harm all women by per-
petuating pernicious stereotypes that make women more vul-
nerable to sexual assault.
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